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ARTICLES
THE TAFT COURT (1921-29)*
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses voting patterns on the United States Su-
preme Court during the October 1921 through 1929 Terms, the pe-
riod when William Howard Taft was Chief Justice.' The Court was
dominated by conservative Justices during this period. The Taft
Court used judicial power actively to police the legislative and execu-
tive branches of federal and local government, in order to enforce the
Justices' commitment to laissez faire economic policies." The Justices
did not, however, extend the use of this judicial activism to protect
civil liberties. The Taft Court assumed an almost entirely passive
posture in civil liberties cases in striking contrast to its constitutional
activism in economic cases.
From roughly 1890 to 1937, the Supreme Court was usually
dominated by conservative Justices who opposed large-scale govern-
ment regulation of business and economic practices.' During the pro-
gressive era, however, the dominance of the Court's conservative
wing was shaken by the arrival of several rather liberal Justices.
© 1984 by Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
* Supreme Court History Project, Publication No. 9.
* Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia
University School of Law; Ph.D., 1970, Graduate Theological Union; Director, Supreme
Court History Project; member, California bar.
1. For additional discussions of the Taft Court, see R. GALLOWAY, THE RIcH AND THE
POOR IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 115-22 (1982); R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDI-
CIAL SUPREMACY 39-74 (1941); A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TArT TO WARREN
39-69 (1964); 2 H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 951-1082
(1939).
2. See L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 269 (1965): "In 1920 the Supreme Court
was still what John Marshall had conceived it to be-the protector and guardian [sic] of prop-
erty. And that was to be its role during the decade in which William Howard Taft was Chief
Justice."
3. See R. GALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 83-131.
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Teddy Roosevelt, for example, appointed Oliver Wendell Holmes in
1903. William Howard Taft appointed Charles Evans Hughes in
1910. Woodrow Wilson added Louis Dembitz Brandeis and John
H. Clarke to the list in 1916." From 1916 to 1921, the liberal wing
was within a vote or two of taking control of the Court, as the fol-
lowing table shows.
TABLE 1
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES--1916 to 1921
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Brandeis McKenna McReynolds
Holmes White Van Devanter
Clarke Pitney
Day I
During this "not-quite progressive era" of Supreme Court history,"
the Court was less committed to conservative activism than it was in
the 1890's, 1920's, and 1930's.
The 1920 presidential election was a referendum on Wilsonian
progressivism. Warren G. Harding, the conservative Republican
candidate, made a pitch to voters who were tired of reform politics.
He argued that America should return to "business as usual"; that
the federal government, which had grown fat and powerful during
World War I, should be cut back; and that the free enterprise system
should be restored to its prior predominance. As Harding put it,
"We want . .. less government in business and more business in
government."
Former President William Howard Taft, a Harding supporter,
worked industriously to make the Supreme Court a major issue of
the 1920 presidential campaign. Taft realized that the Court would
have at least four vacancies during the early 1920's and that the
Court's future orientation depended on whether conservatives or lib-
erals were selected for those seats.
Taft felt that the proudest deeds of his presidency (1909-13)
were his conservative appointments to the Court. He was also keenly
4. Brandeis' appointment was a "fearful shock" to William Howard Taft, then Yale
law professor. He called Brandeis a "Socialist" and stated, "[lit is one of the deepest wounds
that I have had as an American . . .that such a man as Brandeis could be put in the court." 2
H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 952 (1939). Wilson also appointed James C. McReynolds, one
of the most conservative Justices in Supreme Court history.
5. R. GALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 101-13.
6. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 966.
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aware of the manner in which his appointees had used their judicial
prerogatives to protect propertied interests against the proponents of
progressive reform.' By 1920, his appointees were about to leave the
Bench, and Taft was determined to secure replacements to carry on
the conservative tradition and to maintain the judiciary as the final
bulwark in the defense of property. Taft's most famous statement
during the campaign on this issue was the following:
Mr. [President] Wilson is in favor of a latitudinarian construc-
tion of the Constitution of the United States to weaken the pro-
tection it should afford against socialist raids upon property
rights .. . .He has made three appointments to the Supreme
Court. He is understood to be greatly disappointed in the atti-
tude of the first of these [McReynolds] upon such questions.
The other two [Brandeis and Clarke] represent a new school of
constitutional construction, which if allowed to prevail, will
greatly impair our fundamental law. Four of the incumbent
Justices are beyond the retiring age of seventy, and the next
President will probably be called upon to appoint their succes-
sors. There is no greater domestic issue in this election than the
maintenance of the Supreme Court as the bulwark to enforce
the guaranty that no man shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.'
Harding's record seven-million-vote landslide in the 1920 elec-
tion gave Taft exactly the opportunity he wanted. After Harding's
inauguration, four Court vacancies occurred. Harding filled the
empty seats with conservatives including Taft himself; George Suth-
erland, Harding's campaign manager; and railroad attorney Pierce
Butler. These appointments terminated the Court's not-quite pro-
gressive era and initiated a "second age of laissez faire,"'9 a conserva-
tive era that prevailed throughout the 1920's and up to the constitu-
tional revolution of 1937.
The Taft Court's conservatism was well-suited to the temper of
the times. The progressive tide had receded after 1916, and the na-
tion emerged from World War I in an extremely conservative mood.
The hallmarks of the immediate post-war period were anti-subver-
sive witchhunting, racial persecution, "America-first" isolationism,
prohibition, economic conservatism, and strong anti-labor sentiment.
7. Taft's biographer stated, "Above all other things he was proudest of the fact that six
of the nine members of the Supreme Court bore his commission. 'And I have said to them,'
Taft chuckled, 'Damn you, if any of you die, I'll have to disown you.' " Id. at 854.
8. A. MASON, supra note 1, at 40.
9. R. GALLOWAY, supra note 1, at 115-31.
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The decade began with a sputtering economic start, as the nation
suffered through a post-war recession replete with strikes and social
unrest. The economy shook off its torpor, however, and the "Roaring
Twenties" were underway.
Against this historical background, this article will examine the
voting patterns on the Supreme Court during the period from Octo-
ber 1921, to Taft's retirement in the October 1929 Term. The voting
data will be considered one Term at a time.'0 Subsequently, the gen-
eral trends and characteristics of the period as a whole will be
described.
II. THE VOTING PATTERNS
A. The October 1921 Term
When the United States Supreme Court opened its October
1921 Term, a new Chief Justice occupied the center chair. The pre-
vious Chief Justice, Edward White, had died on May 19, 1921, a
mere two months after Warren G. Harding's inauguration as Presi-
dent. Harding, a conservative Republican, nominated former Presi-
dent William Howard Taft to be Chief Justice, which amply repaid
his debt for Taft's campaign support. Taft, once a progressive but by
now a conservative," was elated. He had never really wanted to be
10. In brief, the statistical method used is the following: votes were coded for all deci-
sions in which the majority or plurality opinion was written by an identified Justice and the
Justices' disagreement and dissent rates were then calculated. These data are presented in
appendices A and B, which contain disagreement and dissent tables for each of the Terms
covered by this article. The disagreement and dissent data were then inspected to determine
such matters as bloc alignments, relative dominance, changes in balance of power, and behav-
ior of individual Justices. The findings, together with illustrative case authorities, are
presented separately for each Term in the next section.
A warning to the reader at the outset. Supreme Court voting data from the post-1940
period show vivid bloc alignments and dramatic shifts in the balance of power. Dissent rates as
high as 50% occurred in those later days, and Justices at the Court's opposite poles had disa-
greement rates above 50% and even, on occasion, above 60%. See, e.g., Galloway, The
Roosevelt Court: The Liberals Conquer (1937-1941) and Divide (1941-1946), 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 491 (1983); Galloway, The Vinson Court: Polarization (1946-1949) and
Conservative Dominance (1949-1953), 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV 375 (1982); Galloway, The
Second Period of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend Abates (1957-1961), 19 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 947 (1979); Galloway, The First Decade of the Burger Court: Conservative
Dominance (1969-1979), 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 891 (1981). Unfortunately, the voting
data for the 1921-29 period do not reveal the same vivid patterns. Dissent and disagreement
rates were much lower, and bloc alignments were not so clear. Therefore, analysis of voting
statistics is not as helpful for understanding the Taft Court as it is for later Courts. Yet,
empirical analysis of the voting data remains useful even if it reveals less than anticipated.
11. Taft's biographer, Henry F. Pringle, has written, "And where did the Chief Justice
of the United States stand on the issues of the day? . . . [T]hat the new Chief Justice was
conservative, if not reactionary, in his political and social views is not open to question." 2 H.
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President, but had coveted a seat on the Court for years.
The White-Taft succession pushed the Court only slightly to
the right. White had been a moderate conservative, and Taft, al-
though conservative, was not the reactionary he would become in the
late 1920's. Thus, the Taft succession did not substantially change
the Court's balance of power. At the time of Taft's arrival, the
Court's liberal wing had three members: Brandeis, Holmes, and
Clarke. On the right were McReynolds and Van Devanter, the first
two of the conservative "four horsemen,"a group which would soon
become the Court's strongest bloc. At the Court's statistical center
were Pitney, McKenna, and Day.1 The newly-appointed Taft fit
comfortably into the dominant coalition of moderates and conserva-
tives. The lineup during the October 1921 Term, based strictly on
voting data, is shown in the following table.
TABLE 2
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES--OCTOBER 1921 TERM
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Clarke '- Holmes McReynolds
Brandeis 4-Pitney Van Devanter
McKenna---
Day
Taft
Taft's biographer asserts that the Court "which Taft would
preside over for nearly a decade" was "badly divided."1" However,
the voting data do not reveal the kind of deep divisions characteristic
of more recent times. Dissent and disagreement rates for the October
1921 Term, for example, were low by modern standards. The high-
est dissent rates were posted by liberal Wilson appointees, Clarke
(9.8 percent) and Brandeis (8.3 percent), and the conservative Mc-
Reynolds (7.6 percent), who ironically was also a Wilson ap-
pointee.1 The highest disagreement rates occurred between Clarke
PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 966-67. Cf 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES 2104 (1969), which states, "Taft was a thoroughgoing Social Darwinist,
stubborn defender of the status quo, apologist for economic privilege, inveterate critic of social
democracy-the gigantic symbol of standpattism."
12. The three moderates were in failing health when Taft arrived, and Taft considered
them to be "the weak members" of the Court. Letter from William H. Taft to Horace Taft
(April 17, 1922), quoted in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 971.
13. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 968.
14. See infra app. B, table I for complete data on dissent rates during the October 1921
Term.
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and McReynolds (17.4 percent), and Brandeis and McReynolds
(13.8 percent). The lowest disagreement rates were between Mc-
Reynolds and Van Devanter (3.5 percent), Taft and Van Devanter
(4.1 percent), and Brandeis and Holmes (4.2 percent). 15 The follow-
ing table shows the alignment of the Justices at the Court's left and
right extremes.
TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1921 TERM
VAN Mc-
CLARKE BRANDEIS DEVANTER REYNOLDS
LIBERAL
Clarke 8.2% 13.5% 17.4%
Brandeis -- 13.1% 13.8%
CONSERVATIVE
Van Devanter 3.5%
McReynolds --
Voting data for the October 1921 Term reveal several other in-
teresting patterns. First, Taft's posture in his initial Term, was
closer to the conservatives, Van Devanter and McReynolds, than to
the liberals, Clarke and Brandeis. Second, Holmes, normally consid-
ered a member of the liberal wing along with Clarke and Brandeis,
actually disagreed more often with Clarke than with either McReyn-
olds or Van Devanter. Holmes, however, was closely aligned with
Brandeis. Third, McKenna, who is often listed on the liberal side of
the Court, was also right-of-center. The following table documents
these patterns.
TABLE 4
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1921 TERM
LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
Van Mc-
Clarke Brandeis Devanter Reynolds
HOLMES 11.0% 4.2% 8.7% 9.4%
McKENNA 11.0% 11.9% 9.8% 9.4%
TAFT 9.3% 10.2% 4.1% 8.8%
15. See infra app. A, table 1 for complete data on disagreement rates during the Octo-
ber 1921 Term.
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The decision in Truax v. Corrigan,"' an October 1921 Term
case, most clearly reveals the conservatism of the new Taft Court
and illustrates the main patterns of the 1920's and 1930's. The Su-
preme Court had given its blessing to the labor injunction in the
189 0's,17 and ever since, management had relied heavily on the
courts to break strikes and to stifle the labor movement. In response
to this judicial activism, Arizona enacted a statute, comparable to the
Clayton Act of 1914, which restricted the issuance of injunctions in
the context of labor disputes. In Truax v. Corrigan, the Court
struck down the Arizona statute, throwing its weight against the un-
ions. The lineup of Justices in the case formed a classic split. Taft
wrote the majority opinion on behalf of himself, McReynolds, Van
Devanter, Day, and McKenna. Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke, and
Pitney dissented. 8 The Court's anti-labor posture was also revealed
by the decisions in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council, 9 which reinstated a sweeping injunction against
picketing despite the subsequent passage of the Clayton Act, and in
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.," which held for the
first time that unions are subject to suit and that their funds are
subject to damages claims.
The decision in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,21 revealed this
same kind of conservative constitutional activism. The decision in
this case struck down the Child Labor Tax Act of 1919.2 This trend
continued in a series of five cases in which the Court, over dissents
16. 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (5-4 decision).
17. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 565 (1895).
18. Holmes deprecated "the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute
compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of
the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even though
the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me." 257 U.S. at 344.
19. 257 U.S. 184 (1921) (8-1 decision) (Clarke, J., dissenting).
20. 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (9-0 decision). This case was a cause celebre, which was ar-
gued by Charles Evans Hughes and John W. Davis, two of the era's giants in litigation.
21. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (8-1 decision) (Clarke, J., dissenting). Cf Hill v. Wallace, 259
U.S. 44 (1922) (9-0 decision), decided the same day, which also adopted a narrow view of the
scope of the federal commerce power and struck down the Future Trading Act, which was
passed to control illegal grain trading.
22. This reactionary decision cast doubt upon a line of prior cases going back to Mc-
Cray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904), which indicated that the Court would not inquire
into Congress' motives in enacting tax laws, and it completed the defeat of the progressive era
child labor laws begun in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Taft regretted that the
Drexel Furniture case caused the Court to be viewed as a supporter of child labor, but he
opined, "Unfortunately we cannbt strain the Constitution of the United States to meet the
wishes of good people." Letter from William H. Taft to Horace Taft (May 15, 1922), quoted
in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1014.
1985]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
by the liberals, struck down state government action on the ground
that it had illegally encroached upon interstate commerce and hence
had violated the so-called dormant commerce clause.2
Of course, there were also some liberal victories in similar con-
stitutional cases."' In general however, the cases suggest a Court
which was willing, if not eager, to sit as constitutional censor of
socio-economic regulations which, in the Court's judgment, exces-
sively interfered with liberty of contract and the free play of the cap-
italist system.
B. The October 1922 Term
The effect of the 1920 election on the Supreme Court became
clear during the October 1922 Term. Three personnel changes oc-
curred which tightened the grip of the conservative wing and rele-
gated the liberal wing to its weakest position since the turn of the
century. First, John H. Clarke, a liberal Wilson appointee, resigned
on September 18, 1922, because he felt isolated, impotent, and dis-
satisfied with his job. Former President Woodrow Wilson was dis-
traught upon learning of Clarke's decision and wrote to Clarke,
"Like thousands of other liberals throughout the country, I have
been counting on the influence of you and Justice Brandeis to re-
strain the Court in some measure from the extreme reactionary
course which it seems inclined to follow."" 5 But Wilson's plea was
too late. To replace Clarke, President Harding chose his campaign
manager, George Sutherland, a conservative Republican from Utah,
who "had served in the Senate from 1905 to 1917, where he consist-
ently opposed the progressive policies of Roosevelt and Wilson."' 26
This succession produced a sharp swing to the right in the Court's
balance of power. Clarke's departure reduced the liberal wing to
23. Lemke v. Homer Farmers Elevator Co., 258 U.S. 65 (1922); Lemke v. Farmers
Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282
(1921); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v.
Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921). Clarke and Brandeis dissented in all five cases; Holmes joined
them in two; Pitney dissented in one.
24. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922) (6-3 decision) (substan-
tive due process) (McReynolds, J., Van Devanter, J., and Taft, J., dissenting); Stafford v.
Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (7-1 decision) (commerce power) (McReynolds, J., dissenting);
Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (6-3 decision) (contract clause)
(McReynolds, J., Van Devanter, J., and McKenna, J., dissenting); Railroad Comm'n v. Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S 563 (1922) (9-0 decision) (commerce power; Transportation
Act of 1920 upheld).
25. BAKER, WOODROW WILSON 117 (1937).
26. L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 271 (1965).
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two, "Holmes and Brandeis dissenting." Sutherland's arrival
brought the third of the "four horsemen" to the Court and gave that
conservative bloc its best writer.
Sutherland was seated when the Court opened for business in
October 1922. A month later, on November 13, 1922, moderate Wil-
liam R. Day resigned. To replace him, Harding appointed the
fourth horseman, Pierce Butler, an extremely conservative railroad
attorney from Minnesota.2 7 Butler was seated on January 2, 1923.
The Day-Butler succession pushed the Court still further to the
right. According to one commentator, "Butler's decisions throughout
his years on the Court reveal an almost unrelenting conservatism."2"
Butler would become a stalwart member of the Court's right wing
both in the 1920's and during the battle against the New Deal in the
1930's. "Butler was among the most rigid of the justices who rejected
New Deal legislation. His philosophy was that of laissez faire . . .
",29
Even before Butler had been seated, Mahlon Pitney, a moder-
ately conservative Taft appointee, resigned. To replace Pitney, Har-
ding chose conservative Edward Sanford as his fourth and last ap-
pointee. Although less reactionary than the four horsemen, Sanford
provided still more support for the Court's now all-powerful six-vote
conservative wing.30 Professor Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis'
biographer and a well-known Court historian, described the Court at
the time of Sanford's arrival:
As Taft had foreseen, reconstitution of the supreme bench
quickly followed on the heels of Harding's election. By 1923
four of the nine Justices-George Sutherland, Pierce Butler,
Edward Sanford and Taft himself as Chief Justice-had been
appointed by the Republican President. With Willis Van De-
vanter, James McReynolds, and the infirm Joseph McKenna"
• . . these four judges-all staunchly conservative-heightened
the rigidities of constitutional interpretation. The genial Chief
Justice, described by his biographer as "conservative, if not re-
actionary," [citations omitted] had now realized his long-cher-
27. Taft had recommended Butler's appointment to President Harding.
28. 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES 2187 (1969).
29. Id. at 2190-91.
30. All six of the conservatives remained on the Court through the end of the October
1928 Term. In fact, only one personnel change occurred between Sanford's arrival in 1923 and
Taft's resignation in 1930.
31. "McKenna was already failing by 1921 and the Chief Justice was soon close to
despair over the justice's inability to do his work." 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 968. But
McKenna held on until 1924 before giving in to Taft's pressure to resign.
19851
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ished ambition to preside over a court that could be counted on
to quell any "socialistic raids on property rights." Soon after his
appointment, the Chief Justice (consistent with his view that
the Judge plays an active role in shaping the law) announced at
a conference of the Justices that he "had been appointed to re-
verse a few decisions" and, with his famous chuckle, added, "I
looked right at old man Holmes when I said it." [citations
omitted]82
As suggested by the foregoing quotation and the consensus
among historians and Court-watchers, the following table illustrates
the Court's philosophical makeup after the arrival of the four Har-
ding appointees.
TABLE 5
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES--OCTOBER 1922 & 1923 TERMS
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Brandeis McKenna McReynolds*
Holmes Butler*
Sutherland*
Van Devanter*
Sanford
Taft
The ensuing discussion tests whether the Justices' voting statistics
confirm this hypothesis.
Voting data for the October 1922 Term reveal little about the
philosophical alignment of the Justices. Dissent and disagreement
rates fell drastically from the already low levels of the prior Term.
The data are therefore so limited that the voting patterns have no
statistical significance. The highest dissent rate on the Court (3.6
percent) was posted by the rookie, Sutherland, who dissented in
eight out of 222 cases. Taft dissented in only two out of 223 cases.
And Butler did not cast a single dissent in the 149 he heard."3 The
most probable reason for the drop in dissent rates was that Chief
Justice Taft, like Chief Justice John Marshall before him, abhorred
the use of dissenting opinions and exerted strong personal pressure
on his colleagues to join the Court's decisions. Taft was an amiable
man, renowned for his personal charm and persuasiveness. During
the early years of his tenure, Taft experienced something of a honey-
* These are the four horsemen.
32. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 50 (1964).
33. For complete data on dissent rates during the Term, see infra app. B, table 2.
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moon, and the voices of dissent voluntarily succumbed to his charm.
Because dissent rates ran at such negligible levels, disagreement
rates were also extremely low."' In fact, the highest disagreement
rate between any two Justices who sat throughout the Term was 5.0
percent (Brandeis and Sutherland), in contrast to the 17.4 percent
rate posted between Clarke and McReynolds in the prior Term. If
disagreement rates were always this low, voting statistical analysis
would be useless, and historians would have to rely entirely upon
other sources to determine the political positions of the Justices. For
example, it is agreed that Taft was a conservative Chief Justice. Yet,
in the October 1922 Term, his disagreement rates with Brandeis (1.4
percent) and Holmes (2.2 percent) were lower than those with Suth-
erland (4.5 percent) and McReynolds (3.1 percent). The highest dis-
agreement rate of the Term (5.8 percent) was between Sutherland
and Sanford, the two rookie members of the conservative wing.
One should not be misled by these sparse 1921-22 voting statis-
tics. The character of the Court which emerged after the Term's
three personnel changes was much more conservative than the Court
of a few years prior. Adkins v. Children's Hospital,5 the infamous
landmark decision which marked the beginning of the Court's second
age of laissez faire, provides a good indication of the political charac-
ter of the Court during the October 1922 Term. The constitutional-
ity of Washington, D.C.'s minimum wage statute for women and
children was at issue in this case. This type of legislation epitomized
progressive economic reform. In deciding Adkins, however, the Court
turned the clock back to 1905, the year of the Lochner decision, 6
and flatly held minimum wage legislation to be an unconstitutional
infringement on the liberty of employers and employees to negotiate
employment contracts. Basing his opinion for the Court squarely on
Lochner, Sutherland wrote, "[Fireedom of contract is, nevertheless,
the general rule and restraint the exception."'3 7 This was too much
even for Taft, who dissented along with Holmes and Sanford. Bran-
deis did not participate.
The Taft Court acted as constitutional censor of economic legis-
lation not only in Adkins, but also in a series of other cases scattered
throughout the October 1922 Term. The Court held government ac-
34. See infra app. A, table 2.
35. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Taft's biographer called the Majority opinion "so reactionary
as to be archaic." 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1049. Frankfurter argued the case for the
appellants and lost.
36. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37. 261 U.S. 525, 546.
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tion unconstitutional under the due process clause, the equal protec-
tion clause, the dormant commerce clause, the contract clause, and
the tenth amendment-dual federalism theory of limited federal
power.88
The liberals too won some cases during the October 1923
Term, including the landmark case, Moore v. Dempsey. 9 Moore was
one of the earliest cases in the Court's twentieth century struggle to
protect the civil rights of black people. The main characteristic of the
Term, however, was conservative constitutional activism.
C. The October 1923 Term
Nearly two months before the opening of the October 1923
Term, President Harding died. Taft expressed great sorrow, but felt
assured the conservative philosophy of the Court would remain
unchanged.
[M]y feeling of deep regret is somewhat mitigated by the
confidence I have in the wisdom, conservatism and courage of
his successor. . . . [H]e [Coolidge] is deeply imbued with a
sense of obligation to follow Mr. Harding's policies, especially
Mr. Harding's purpose to defend the institutions of the country
against wild radicals.' °
Taft advised "Silent Cal" to "do nothing,"' 1 which the new Presi-
dent ably heeded as the scandals of Harding's administration swirled
around him in the next few years.
The Supreme Court's personnel remained stable throughout the
38. E.g., Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679 (1923) (9-0 decision) (substantive due process; rates); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553 (1923) (5-3 decision) (dormant commerce clause) (Holmes, J., Brandeis, J., and
McReynolds, J., dissenting); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S.
544 (1923) (7-2 decision) (equal protection) (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indust. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (9-0 decision)
(substantive due process; business affected with a public interest); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v.
Mayor and Council, 262 U.S. 441 (1923) (9-0 decision) (contract clause); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (7-2 decision) (substantive due process) (Holmes, J. and Sutherland, J.,
dissenting); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (7-2 decision) (substantive due process)
(Holmes, J., and Sutherland, J., dissenting); Davis v. Farmer's Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S.
312 (1923) (8-0 decision) (dormant commerce clause); Missouri v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 276 (1923) (9-0 decision) (telephone rates). And there were many more. The Court held
government action unconstitutional in at least 25 cases during the Term. Of course, the Court
also rejected similar challenges in a number of cases.
39. 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (McReynolds, J., and Sutherland, J., dissenting).
40. Letter from William H. Taft to St. G. R. Fitzhugh (Aug. 14, 1923), quoted in 2 H.
PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1019.
41. Letter from William H. Taft to Horace Taft (Sept. 29, 1923), quoted in 2 H.
PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1019.
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October 1923 Term, which was the third Term of the Taft Court.
The lineup of Justices remained the same as that which emerged at
the end of the prior Term after the arrival of Harding's four appoin-
tees. The Court was dominated by its conservative wing, which in-
cluded the closely aligned quintet: Taft, Sanford, Van Devanter,
Sutherland, and Butler. McReynolds was even farther out on the
right; and McKenna shifted back to the right after a somewhat more
moderate trend during the progressive era. The liberal wing was re-
duced to two, Brandeis and Holmes. In fact, Brandeis was the only
political liberal on the Court.42
As in the prior Term, the voting statistics reveal little. Taft sup-
pressed dissent so successfully that, on the average, there was only
one dissent in every five cases. Taft dissented only once in 210 cases.
Sutherland, Butler, and Sanford each dissented twice. Even the noto-
riously cantankerous McReynolds cast a mere eight dissents in 212
cases. The highest dissent rate (4.2 percent) was posted by Brandeis,
who dissented more than Taft, Sutherland, Butler, and Sanford
combined.
Because dissent rates were so low, there were not enough dis-
agreements between the Justices to provide any vivid bloc-voting pat-
terns. In general, disagreement rates were also low and rather evenly
distributed. Perhaps the most striking pattern was the extremely low
disagreement rates among the five-vote conservative bloc that in-
cluded Butler, Sutherland, Van Devanter, Taft, and Sanford. Mc-
Reynolds, on the far right, had somewhat higher disagreement rates
with his conservative brethren, as did Brandeis who was on the far
left. The following table contains data illustrating these patterns.
TABLE 6
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1923 TERM
VAN SUTHER- MC-
TAFT SANFORD DEVANTER LAND BUTLER REYNOLDS
BRANDEIS 4.3% 5.2% 5.2% 4.9% 5.7% 7.1%
TAFT -- 1.4% 0.5% 1.5% 1.0% 3.8%
SANFORD -- 1.9% 1.0% 2.4% 2.8%
VAN DEVANTER -- 1.9% 0.5% 4.7%
SUTHERLAND 
-- 2.4% 2.4%
BUTLER -- 4.3%
42. Holmes' judicial liberalism was largely theresult of his jurisprudential commitment
to judicial restraint rather than any personal belief in economic liberalism.
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The liberals, Brandeis and Holmes, were quite close in their judicial
philosophy and disagreed in only three of 212 cases (1.4 percent).
Holmes, however, was suprisingly close to the conservatives and dis-
agreed with Taft, for example, in only 2.9 percent of the cases.
In all, the statistical patterns are nebulous and reveal far
weaker bloc alignments than would be expected based on historical
accounts of the jurisprudential differences between the conservatives
and liberals. If, as one commentator says, this was a "badly divided"
Court,4 it does not show in the voting data for the October 1923
Term.
One of the favorite slogans used by Court historians to describe
the Court in the 1920's is "Holmes and Brandeis dissenting." The
slogan had some validity, albeit limited, for the October 1923 Term.
Brandeis joined Holmes every time he dissented during the Term.
The cases in which the two dissented suggest some of the battle lines
between the conservatives and liberals that already existed in the
1920's and became even more pronounced in the 1930's. In Texas
Transport & Terminal Co. v. City of New Orleans,"" for example,
Holmes and Brandeis dissented from the Court's ruling that a New
Orleans business license tax violated the dormant commerce clause.
In Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan,45 the two liberals objected as the
majority actively used substantive due process to strike down a stat-
ute regulating the weight of loaves of bread offered for sale. In Pa-
cific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Francisco4 6 these same two
Justices contended that the Court had used an incorrect formula to
decide that the utility rates set by the city of San Francisco violated
Pacific Gas & Electric's due process rights. In each case, the liberals
protested that the conservative majority was being too activist in its
constitutional censorship of economic regulations. Taft's anti-dissent
policy was so successful, however, that Holmes and Brandeis only
dissented together in six of the Term's 213 cases.47
Holmes and Brandeis did join a number of the conservative ma-
jority victories. These cases show that the Court's activism in the
economic area did not extend to civil liberties issues..For example,
43. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 968.
44. 264 U.S. 150 (1924) (7-2 decision).
45. 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (7-2 decision).
46. 265 U.S. 403 (1924) (7-2 decision).
47. The other three were Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (7-2 decision) (tax);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 263 U.S. 350 (1923) (5-3 decision) (dormant commerce
clause); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923) (6-2 decision) (criminal procedure).
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aliens lost a series of equal protection cases."' Clallam County v.
United States49 revealed the Court's activist use of intergovernmental
tax immunities. FTC v. Raymond Brothers-Clark Co.50 restricted
the FTC's power to declare business practices "unfair methods of
competition." Railroad Commission v. Eastern Texas R.R. Co. 51
held that a state commission's order requiring a railroad to operate
one passenger train a day violated substantive due process. Finally,
Hester v. United States52 adopted a narrow reading of the fourth
amendment, by its holding that intrusions into "open fields" do not
constitute "searches."
Of course, there were also some noteworthy liberal decisions. In
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore,53 the Court upheld Utah's
Workman's Compensation Act against challenges that abrogation of
the common law defenses violated substantive due process and equal
protection. McReynolds, Butler, and McKenna dissented in this
case. In Dayton, Goose-Creek Railway Co. v. United States," "per-
haps the high point of pre-1937 judicial tolerance for economic re-
form legislation,' 55 the Court unanimously upheld the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920. The Act included an authorization permitting the
government to divert railroad profits above six percent to other, less
profitable railroad companies. The authorization was considered "so-
cialistic" by the conservatives of the era. 6
D. The October 1924 Term
When the Supreme Court opened for business in October 1924,
the presidential campaign was in its final weeks. Calvin Coolidge,
48. E.g., Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) (8-0 decision); Terrace v. Thomp-
son, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (8-0 decision). These cases held that aliens may be prohibited from
owning land.
49. 263 U.S. 341 (1923) (9-0 decision).
50. 263 U.S. 565 (1924) (9-0 decision).
51. 264 U.S. 79 (1924) (9-0 decision).
52. 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (9-0 decision).
53. 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
54. 263 U.S. 456 (1924).
55. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 148 (1960). Cf 2 H. PRINGLE,
supra note 1, at 1011:
The decision ... is one which illustrates the peril which lies in any attempt
to classify as liberal or conservative a member of the Supreme Court .... Chief
Justice Taft must have been somewhat dismayed early in 1924 ... if he heard
that the New Republic, that unsound and radical organ, had hailed his opinion
in the Dayton, Goose-Creek case as an important contribution to "economic
liberalism."
56. See 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1010.
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who had succeeded after Harding's death in 1923, was the conserva-
tive Republican incumbent. He was challenged by the conservative
Democrat candidate, John W. Davis, one of the most gifted Supreme
Court advdocates of the twentieth century; and by Robert La Fol-
lette, the Wisconsin progressive. In Taft's view, "[Tlhe welfare of
the country is critically dependent upon the success of President
Coolidge.""7 Coolidge's victory in November insured that the pre-
vailing conservativism of the 1920's would continue for another four
years, and this provided a comfortable climate for the conservative
Taft Court. By 1924, the economy had shaken off its earlier reces-
sion and the 1923-28 boom was underway, which provided further
support to the delusion that all was well with the status quo. These
were the days of the "Roaring Twenties," replete with all their well-
known paradoxes and contradictions.
The Supreme Court's October 1924 Term, the fourth Term of
the Taft era, witnessed another personnel change, the fifth since the
start of the decade. Joseph McKenna, a moderate Republican, had
been failing for years and had been unable to handle complex cases,
at least since Taft's arrival in 1921. Taft had been trying to per-
suade McKenna to retire for several years, and finally, in November
1924, Taft bluntly told the senior Justice that he had been carrying
him by assigning him only simple cases and that the time had come
to retire. McKenna gave in and retired effective January 15, 1925.
To replace McKenna, President Coolidge appointed his Attorney
General, Harlan Fiske Stone, former New York City lawyer and
Dean of Columbia Law School.58 Once on the Court, Stone would
soon become a member of the liberal wing, an opponent of the four
horsemen, an advocate of judicial restraint in economic cases, and,
after 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Chief Justice. "Taft at first
viewed [Stone] with approval and then, because of his dissents and
his liberal leanings, with extreme distaste,"'" according to one com-
mentator. In his first Term, Stone was closest to Holmes, agreeing
with him in eighty-four out of the eighty-five cases in which both
participated.
57. Id. at 1061.
58. Taft recommended Stone's appointment. "I rather forced the President into his ap-
pointment." Letter from William H. Taft to R. A. Taft (July 2, 1925), quoted in 2 H. PRIN-
GLE, supra note 1, at 1043. He later regretted the appointment, concluding, "Stone ... defi-
nitely has ranged himself with Brandeis and with Holmes in a good many of our constitutional
differences." Letter from William H. Taft to C. P. Taft III (May 12, 1929), quoted in 2 H.
PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1044.
59. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1060.
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The lineup on the Court after Stone's arrival, as reported by
most Court historians, is shown in the following table.
TABLE 7
ALIGNMENT OF ,JUSTICES--OCTOBER 1924-1928 TERMS
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Brandeis McReynolds
Holmes Butler
Stone Sutherland
Van Devanter
Sanford
Taft
There can be no doubt that the McKenna-Stone succession strength-
ened the Court's liberal wing. McKenna had begun his career as a
conservative Republican, had shifted into a moderate stance during
the Progressive Era, and had shifted back to the right in more recent
years.60 Stone, in contrast, allied himself with Holmes and Brandeis,
lending the force of his argumentative personality and vigorous intel-
lect to the liberal wing. This alliance incited Holmes and Brandeis to
increase their protests against the prevailing constitutional activism
of the Court's conservative wing.
As in the prior two Terms, the voting data for the October 1924
Term confirm neither the clear liberal-conservative bloc alignment,
nor the conservative dominance that might be expected based upon
the opinions of Court historians. Perhaps the most surprising pattern
is that dissent rates were higher on the far right than on the far left.
The following table shows that dissent rates were up on the right
and down to very low levels on the left.
60. In his final partial Term, however, McKenna was closely aligned with the liberals.
He did not disagree with Holmes a single time in 82 cases and he disagreed with Brandeis
only once in 81 cases. In contrast, he posted a 6.1% disagreement rate with McReynolds.
1985]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 8
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1923 & 1924 TERMS
OCT. 1923 OCT. 1924
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Brandeis 4.2% 2.6% -1.6%
Holmes 2.8% 0.9% -1.9%
Stone 0.0%
CONSERVATIVE
Sutherland 1.0% 3.5% +2.5%
Butler 3.8% 5.6% +1.8%
This finding is certainly contrary to the usual image of the Taft
Court's conservative dominance. To make matters more confusing, a
number of the dissents by McReynolds and other "conservatives" es-
poused apparently "liberal" positions. 1
Data concerning disagreement rates during the October 1924
Term are not very revealing. The highest disagreement rate (8.3
percent) was between McReynolds and Brandeis. A bloc-voting pat-
tern began to emerge on the left, as Holmes posted very low disa-
greement rates with both Brandeis (1.7 percent) and Stone (1.2 per-
cent). After McReynolds, Sutherland had the highest disagreement
rates with the liberals. Most interestingly, the Justices who were
closest to the Court's statistical center, Taft, Sanford, Van Devanter,
and even Butler, leaned toward the Brandeis-Holmes pole rather
than toward the McReynolds-Sutherland pole. This is shown in the
following table.
61. E.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (6-3 deci-
sion) (antitrust); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (7-1 decision) (dormant commerce
clause); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (7-2 decision) (fourth amendment).
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TABLE 9
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1924 TERM
LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
Suther- Mc-
JUSTICE Brandeis Holmes land Reynolds
TAFT 3.9% 2.2% 4.8% 6.1%
SANFORD 3.9% 2.2% 3.5% 4.3%
VAN DEVANTER 3.5% 1.7% 1.3% 4.8%
BUTLER 3.9% 2.2% 3.1% 6.1%
Without a doubt, the most important case of the October 1924
Term was Gitlow v. New York. 2 This landmark case was the first to
hold that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incor-
porates the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression
and thereby makes the first amendment applicable to the States.6"
Ironically, this landmark case, which greatly expanded first amend-
ment law, demonstrates the conservatism of the Taft Court rather
than any major strain of liberalism. The Majority applied the reac-
tionary "remote bad tendency" test that was then dominant in fed-
eral first amendment cases6 ' and affirmed Benjamin Gitlow's convic-
tion for distributing the "Left Wing Manifesto" although the
prosecution could make no showing that Gitlow had created any se-
rious danger. Brandeis and Holmes dissented, claiming that speech
may not be punished absent a clear and present danger of some seri-
ous evil. The incorporation point, for which Gitlow is justly famous,
was treated almost as a "throw-away" line without any serious anal-
ysis or explanation, and it became one of the most important
"asides" in Supreme Court history." Gitlow was the first major, and
only important liberal-activist free speech case in the entire Taft era
62. 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (7-2 decision).
63. Gitlow is often called the first "incorporation" case. Actually, an earlier case, Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), held that the fourteenth amendment
imposes the same requirements on the States (public purpose; just compensation) that the fifth
amendment eminent domain clause imposes on the federal government. The case, however, did
not use reasoning based on the "incorporation" theory, although it is now often treated as an
incorporation case.
64. The remote bad tendency test allowed the government to punish speech if: (1) the
speaker intended to encourage conduct that the government may ban; and (2) the speech had
any tendency to produce such conduct.
65. Another is the assertion that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, which was made without support or discussion in Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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of Supreme Court history.
In terms of lasting fame, at least two other October 1924 Term
cases merit attention. Pierce v. Society of Sisters" held that states
may not require children to attend public schools if their parents
want to send them to private, religious schools. Commentators, in-
cluding later Supreme Court Justices, have since puzzled over how
to characterize the Pierce case. Is it, as some have said, another ex-
ample of the conservative constitutional activism characteristic of the
pre-1937 Court? After all, the arch-conservative McReynolds was
the author of the majority opinion which struck down a state law on
the basis of substantive due process. Or is Pierce an important fore-
runner of the post-1937 liberal constitutional activism in civil liber-
ties cases which reached full flower in Griswold v. Connecticut61
and its progeny? Whatever the outcome of this debate, Pierce has, in
fact, been cited repeatedly and favorably by the modern Court as a
precedent for its liberal-activist decisions.
The third October 1924 Term case of lasting significance is
Carroll v. United States, 8 the landmark case that created the so-
called "automobile exception" to the fourth amendment warrant re-
quirement. Carroll is one of the many prohibition cases that both
burdened the Court in the 1920's and produced an explosion of
fourth amendment law. On a road outside Detroit, prohibition
agents stopped a car suspected of transporting bootleg liquor. They
searched the car without a warrant and found illicit liquor which
was later used as evidence to convict Carroll. In upholding the
search, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, as a general rule
under the fourth amendment, warrantless searches are illegal, but it
held that an "exception" exists allowing warrantless searches of cars
based upon probable cause to believe that contraband is present. The
"mobility" of the car creates the "exigent circumstances" which jus-
tify the warrantless search. If an immediate search is not conducted,
the car may leave the jurisdiction and the contraband may disappear.
The "automobile exception" was only the second exception to the
warrant requirement approved by the Court,69 but it was a noted
forerunner of the many exceptions to the warrant and probable
cause requirements that have proliferated in recent years. Carroll
illustrates the law-and-order conservatism of the Taft Court. Curi-
66. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (9-0 decision).
67. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (7-2 decision).
69. The first was the "search incident to arrest" exception, which was recognized as
early as Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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ously, McReynolds and Sutherland dissented, while Brandeis and
Holmes joined Taft's majority opinion.
The bulk of the cases decided during the October 1924 Term,
however, were not of lasting significance. Of the 231 cases decided
during the Term, only Gitlow, Pierce, and Carroll would be widely
recognized by modern law students and scholars. The remainder
were the ordinary cases that ground their way through the courts in
the 1920's, including judicial review of economic regulations, war-
related cases, and prohibition cases.
It is important to note that the Court had no control over its
docket through the end of 1924. Under prior law, the Court was
forced to decide virtually any case involving a federal question if an
attorney chose to push the case up by means of a writ of error. Thus,
most of the cases before the pre-1925 Court did not involve espe-
cially momentous legal questions, and the Court was sinking into a
growing flood of cases.
Perhaps Taft's greatest achievement as Chief Justice is that he
successfully resolved this problem. From the time of his arrival in
1921, he was determined to give the Court control over its own
docket so that it could limit the number of its cases and focus only on
those which raised important questions. Taft proposed a statute to
remedy this problem in the October 1921 Term. Success was
achieved in February, 1925, when Congress enacted the Judges Act
of 1925. This revolutionary statute cancelled writs of error, restricted
the cases in which appeals "as of right" are allowed to the Supreme
Court, and provided that most cases may only be reviewed if four of
the nine Justices vote to issue a writ of certiorari. Because the grant
of certiorari is completely discretionary, the Justices could henceforth
pick and choose only those cases important enough to merit the
Court's attention and deny review to the rest.
Because the October 1924 Term was the last to be bound by the
old rules, the Court was still forced to review a large number of
minor cases. Other than Gitlow, Pierce, and Carroll, few are worth
mentioning. One much-noted case at the time was Coronado Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers,70 which reversed a lower court's ruling
that the United Mine, Workers could not be sued under the Sherman
Act and remanded the case for a third trial. This was the second trip
to the Supreme Court for this important litigation,7 ' which increased
"the potentialities of the Sherman law as a weapon against
70. 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (9-0 decision).
71. 259 U.S. 344; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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unions."
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E. The October 1925 Term
Taft's honeymoon continued into the October 1925 Term, as all
the Justices were being "good fellows" by going along with the ma-
jority and not casting dissents."3 The average dissent rate was 0.16
per case, less than one dissent in every six cases, down twenty per-
cent from the already minuscule rate of the previous Term. Taft did
not dissent at all. Van Devanter and Butler cast one dissent each. In
one stretch, forty straight cases were unanimous, and only one dis-
sent was cast in seventy-two straight cases. In all, 192 out of 209
cases were unanimous. There was virtually no bloc voting. The fa-
mous liberal trio, Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, dissented as a bloc
only twice. 74 The conservative four horsemen-McReynolds, Butler,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter- dissented as a bloc just once.7"
In a Term such as this, the voting data reveal very little other
than repetitive unanimity. The Justices with the closest ideologies
were Sanford, Taft, Van Devanter, Butler, and Sutherland. The fol-
lowing table shows their nearly one hundred percent cohesion and
includes their disagreement rates with Brandeis for contrast.
TABLE 10
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1925 TERM
VAN SUTHER-
TAFT DEVANTER BUTLER LAND BRANDEIS
SANFORD 1.4% 1.9% 1.9% 2.4% 3.4%
TAFT -- 0.5% 0.5% 2.0% 3.9%
VAN DEVANTER 0.0% 1.5% 4.3%
BUTLER 
-- 1.5% 4.3%
SUTHERLAND I I15.9%7
72. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1042.
73. "A 'good fellow' in the mind of Chief Justice Taft, was an associate who did not
come forward with embarrassing dissenting views ... ." Id. at 971. In 1925, Holmes told
Taft that the Court was then much more harmonious than it had been under Chief Justice
White, and Brandeis agreed. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 58
(1964).
74. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (state economic regulation vio-
lates substantive due process); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (state tax violates
equal protection).
75. Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U.S. 204 (1925) (tax). The dissenters did not even file an
opinion.
76. This rate was tied with the 5.9% McReynolds-Stone disagreement rate as the high-
est of the Term. It makes a striking contrast to the 66.2% Rehnquist-Douglas disagreement
rate in the October 1972 Term.
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The dissent rates suggest a minor shift to the right. Dissent
rates rose marginally on the left and dropped marginally on the
right, leaving the dissents equally divided among the Justices on the
far left and right. This eliminated the advantage held by the liberals
during the prior Term.
TABLE 11
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1924 & 1925 TERMS
OCT. 1924 OCT. 1925
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Brandeis 2.6% 3.9% + 1.3%
Holmes 0.0% 2.0% +2.0%
CONSERVATIVE
Sutherland 3.5% 2.0% -1.5%
McReynolds 5.6% 4.3% -1.3%
In fact, the dissent rates of the five most conservative Justices de-
clined, while those of the four most liberal Justices rose,77 but the
changes were so minor that they hardly amounted to a major shift.
The cases that were decided during the October 1925 Term
were almost as nondescript as the voting patterns. Not a single
landmark case of lasting significance was decided. There were no
first amendment cases, only one race case, and very few criminal
procedure cases. The vast bulk of cases involved economic issues such
as war claims, freight rates, tax matters, and bankruptcies. Natu-
rally, many cases involved constitutional censorship of economic reg-
ulations under the due process clause, the equal protection clause,
the dormant commerce clause, and similar provisions, but no
landmark decisions comparable to Truax and Adkins were issued.
Perhaps the most famous-or infamous-of the Term's cases was
Corrigan v. Buckley,78 which upheld restrictive covenants banning
the sale of real property to racial minorities. Another case sometimes
mentioned in the history books is Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co. ,79
in which the Court, over the dissents by Holmes, Brandeis, and
Stone, used substantive due process to strike down a state law regu-
lating the quality of material used in the manufacture of bedding.
Weaver is said to illustrate the Taft Court's conservative activism
77. See infra app. B, table 5.
78. 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (9-0 decision).
79. 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (6-3 decision).
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and willingness to strike down laws which were unpopular with the
Justices. But it must be admitted that the October 1925 Term was
mild in this regard.
In short, it may have been the "Roaring Twenties" in the
speakeasies, but it was the "Boring Twenties" at the Supreme
Court, at least during the October 1925 Term.
F. The October 1926 Term
Professor Alpheus Thomas Mason wrote that the Taft Court,
after an early period of relative harmony and unanimity, began to
break apart into two hostile wings as the 1920's progressed. "The
line drawn between the conservative Right, led by the Chief Justice,
and the liberal Left, consisting of Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, be-
came increasingly sharp. . ... -8 This division began in the October
1926 Term, and was characterized by higher levels of dissent and
disagreement and much more hotly-contested and interesting cases
than the prior four Terms.
The average dissent rate shot up by 120 percent during the
Term, to reach the highest level since the October 1921 Term, the
first of the Taft era.8' Every Justice on the Court had a higher dis-
sent rate than in the prior Term, and some of the Justices had large
increases. Butler's rate jumped to nine times its level in the October
1925 Term; Holmes' was nearly three and one-half times as high;
Stone's was two and one-half times as high; and Sutherland, Van
Devanter, and Brandeis almost doubled their rates of dissent. In
short, Taft's honeymoon ended in the October 1926 Term, and his
colleagues on both extremes stepped up their attacks on one another
in dissenting opinions, much to Taft's chagrin.
The balance of power shifted to the right in the October 1926
Term. The liberals, Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone, cast thirty-four of
the Court's sixty-nine dissents during the Term. By far, the lowest
dissent rates were posted by the three moderate conservatives, Taft
(1.0 percent), Van Devanter (1.0 percent), and Sanford (1.5 per-
cent). At last, after several Terms of nebulous and surprisingly mod-
erate voting patterns, the Taft Court began to vote more like the
conservative Court that the history books describe. The following ta-
ble shows the shift to the right from the October 1924 Term, when
the liberals had the edge in the won-lost column.
80. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT To WARREN 61 (1964).
81. The average was 0.35 dissents per case, still very low by modern standards and far
below the roughly 2.2 averages of the October 1957, 1959, 1960, and 1972 Terms.
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TABLE 12
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1924 & 1926 TERMS
OCT. 1924 OCT. 1926
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Brandeis 2.6% 7.1% +4.5%
Holmes 0.9% 5.1% +4.2%
Stone 0.0% 5.2% + 5.2%
CONSERVATIVE
Sutherland 3.5% 4.1% +0.6%
McReynolds 5.6% 5.6% 0.0%
The Court was much more polarized in the October 1926 Term
than in the prior four Terms. The lineup of Justices, based on the
voting statistics, was 3-2-4, with Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone on the
left, Taft and Sanford in the center, and the four horsemen on the
right. Disagreement rates were up to twice or more the levels of the
prior Term, reflecting the jump in dissent rates. The following table
shows some of the more salient disagreement patterns.
TABLE 13
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1926 TERM
SUTHER-
BRANDEIS HOLMES LAND BUTLER
LEFT
Brandeis 3.1% 11.3% 11.9%
Holmes -- 9.2% 9.7%
RIGHT
Sutherland 1.5%
Butler
CENTER
Taft 7.1% 4.1% 6.2% 6.7%
Sanford 7.6% 5.6% 3.6% 5.1%
The cases decided during the October 1926 Term were much
more interesting than those of prior Terms. The case that drew the
most attention at the time was Myers v. United States, 2 which held
82. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (6-3 decision) (Brandeis, J., Holmes, J., and McReynolds, J.,
dissenting). At the time, Taft told a friend, "I never wrote an opinion that I felt to be so
important in its effect." Letter from William H. Taft to W. M. Bullitt (Nov. 4, 1926), quoted
in 2 H. PRINGLE, Supra note 1, at 1025.
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that Congress may not restrict the power of the President to remove
executive officials.88 Taft spent more time on this case than any
other, and he was quite chagrined that Brandeis, Holmes, and Mc-
Reynolds refused to join his opinion."4 Two landmark cases decided
during the Term had conservative results. Whitney v. California8"
applied the non-speech-protective remote bad tendency test86 in up-
holding a criminal syndicalism conviction. 87 Buck v. Bell88 upheld
the sterilization of a mentally retarded inmate, with Holmes writing
one of his most reactionary opinions and stating, "[t]hree generations
of imbeciles are enough."8"
Several liberal landmarks of lasting importance were laid down
in the October 1926 Term. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,90 for example, eschewed the usual conservative constitutional
activism and put forward the modern doctrine of judicial restraint in
zoning cases. McReynolds, Butler, and Van Devanter dissented.
Nixon v. Herndon" struck a rare blow on behalf of racial minori-
ties, holding Texas's "white primary" unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause. Fiske v. Kansas" showed a little liberal ac-
tivism in the free speech field. The Court threw out Fiske's convic-
tion which was based solely on his soliciting members for the Work-
ers' Industrial Union. Finally, McGrain v. Daugherty" suggested
83. The holding was later modified by Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935), which held that Congress may create quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial offices
not subject to the removal power.
84. Pringle writes:
No other case required so much work or aroused in him comparable bitterness
when it became clear that all his brothers would not follow him . . . .Having
delivered the opinion on October 25, the Chief justice boiled over again:
McReynolds and Brandeis belong to a class of people that have no
loyalty to the court and sacrifice almost everything to the gratification of
their own publicity and wish to stir up dissatisfaction with the decision
of the court, if they don't happen to agree with it.
Letter from William H. Taft to Horace Taft (Oct. 27, 1926), quoted in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra
note 1, at 1023, 1024-25.
85. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (9-0 decision).
86. See supra note 64.
87. Justices Brandeis and Holmes submitted a concurring opinion criticizing the major-
ity's failure to use the clear and present danger test.
88. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (8-1 decision). Butler dissented and revealed some of the liber-
tarianism that Douglas later claimed was one of Butler's underrated characteristics. W.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUG-
LAS 15-16 (1980).
89. 274 U.S. at 207.
90. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (6-3 decision).
91. 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (9-0 decision).
92. 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (8-0 decision).
93. 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (9-0 decision).
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some restraints on legislative investigations that would later prove
useful in combating the excesses of the McCarthy era.
The conservative wing won a series of victories in the October
1926 Term in bloc-voting cases which were superseded by later,
more liberal developments. The cases remain of historical interest
because of what they reveal about voting patterns and legal doctrines
of the 1920's. Brandeis and Holmes dissented together in nine cases,
and Stone joined them in five. The most famous of the cases in
which Brandeis and Holmes dissented were Myers v. United
States,4 and Tyson v. Banton." Tyson held that a theater ticket bro-
kerage is not a "business affected with a public interest" and that
substantive due process therefore prohibits government price regula-
tions in that field. In Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters' Association," the Court "increased again . ..labor's jeop-
ardy under the Sherman law"9 and held that a concerted refusal by
union members to work on materials produced by nonunion workers
violated the antitrust laws."8 The Court also issued two decisions
which cut back the power of the Federal Trade Commission, over
dissents by two or more liberals." In addition, the conservatives
evoked liberal dissent when they engaged in constitutional censorship
of economic legislation in several other cases.100
94. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
95. 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (5-4 decision) (Brandeis, J., Holmes, J., Stone, J., and San-
ford, J., dissenting).
96. 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (7-2 decision) (Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J., dissenting). Stone,
"who was beginning to annoy the Chief Justice by his dissents," (2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1,
at 1043), filed a concurring opinion expressing reservations about the majority's opinion.
97. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1042.
98. Alpheus Thomas Mason has argued that this case classically illustrates the Court's
alignment on business issues in the late 1920's. Taft and the four horsemen took the antiunion
position, using the antitrust laws as a weapon against the labor movement. Brandeis and
Holmes dissented vigorously, causing McReynolds to label Brandeis a subversive. Taft put
pressure on Stone and Sanford to vote with the majority in order to prevent a 5-4 split, and the
latter two Justices finally did reluctantly agree. See A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM
TAFT TO WARREN 61, et seq. (1964).
99. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 272 U.S. 619 (1927) (7-2 decision) (Brandeis, J., and
Stone, J., dissenting); FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1927) (5-4 decision) (Bran-
deis, J., Holmes, J., Stone, J., and Taft, C. J., dissenting).
100. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927) (7-2 decision) (equal protection)
(Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J., dissenting); Ohio Public Serv. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Fritz, 274
U.S. 12 (1927) (7-2 decision) (contract clause) (Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J., dissenting);
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (6-3 decision) (substantive due pro-
cess) (Brandeis, J., Holmes, J., and Stone, J., dissenting); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S.
34 (1927) (6-3 decision) (dormant commerce clause) (Brandeis, J., Holmes, J., and Stone, J.,
dissenting); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926) (7-2 decision) (sub-
stantive due process) (Brandeis, J., and Stone, J., dissenting).
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G. The October 1927 Term
The effectiveness of Taft's policy of enforced unanimity contin-
ued to fade during the October 1927 Term. The liberals stepped up
their protests, and pushed the disagreement and dissent rates to some
of the highest levels of the decade. The following table shows the
increased polarization of the Court's extremes.
TABLE 14
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1927 TERM
Mc- SUTHER-
BRANDEIS HOLMES REYNOLDS LAND
LIBERAL
Brandeis 1.1% 12.0% 19.1%
Holmes 
-- 13.1% 17.4%
CONSERVATIVE
McReynolds 8.7%
Sutherland
The 19.1 percent disagreement rate between Brandeis and Suther-
land was the highest of the entire Taft era. The 17.4 percent rate
between Holmes and Sutherland tied the Clarke-McReynolds split
of the October 1921 Term as the second highest.
Because the October 1927 Term witnessed the most vivid voting
bloc alignment of the decade, it is perhaps worthwhile to note the
alignment of the remaining Justices. Sanford moved sharply to the
right and posted the third most conservative voting record during the
Term. Taft was also substantially right of center, as were Butler and
Van Devanter. Stone, in contrast, was substantially left of the
Court's statistical center.
TABLE 15
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1927 TERM
LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
Mc- Suther-
Brandeis Holmes Reynolds land
STONE 6.0% 4.8% 9.0% 11.0%
TAFT 9.7% 9.7% 4.6% 6.1%
VAN DEVANTER 9.8% 9.8% 4.6% 6.1%
BUTLER 9.7% 10.9% 4.6% 6.1%
SANFORD 10.9% 12.0% 5.7% 4.3%
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In short, the lineup during the October 1927 Term was as
follows:
TABLE 16
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES--OCTOBER 1927 TERM
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Brandeis Sutherland
Holmes . McReynolds
Stone Sanford
Butler
Van Devanter
Taft
This is the 6-3 alignment commonly described in the history books
for the 1925-30 period of Supreme Court history, and, in fact, it
does reflect the real balance of power on the later Taft Court. In
other Terms, Taft's policy of suppressing dissent successfully con-
cealed the underlying philosophical split and created a false impres-
sion of consensus of a Court that was, in reality, "badly divided."10 1
Thus, although the October 1927 Term had atypical voting data for
the 1920's, it was actually the archetypal Term of the decade in the
sense that it revealed the actual policy differences that existed on the
Taft Court.
During the October 1927 Term, dissent rates on the left contin-
ued the sharp increase which had begun in the prior two Terms.
Brandeis and Holmes dissented in 9.7 percent of the cases, the sec-
ond highest dissent rate of the Taft era. Stone's dissent rate jumped
by fifty percent to 7.8 percent, fourth highest of the Taft era. This
left the conservatives with a clear edge in the won-lost column.
Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone were responsible for 65.3 percent (47/
72) of the Terms's dissents. Taft and Van Devanter, in contrast, did
not dissent at all. The following table illustrates the Court's statisti-
cal swing to the right during the 1924-28 period.
101. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 968; see also supra note 13 and accompanying
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TABLE 17
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1924 & 1927 TERMS
OCT. 1924 OCT. 1927
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Brandeis 2.6% 9.7% +7.1%
Holmes 0.9% 9.7% +8.8%
Stone 0.0% 7.8% +7.8%
CONSERVATIVE
Taft 2.2% 0.0% -2.2%
McReynolds 5.6% 4.6% -1.0%
Among all the Terms of the 1920's, the phrase "Holmes and
Brandeis dissenting" most accurately described the October 1927
Term.'" Holmes and Brandeis dissented together sixteen times, and
Stone joined them in ten.103 In Ribnik v. McBride,"04 for example,
the Court continued its attack on price regulation, holding that em-
ployment agencies are not "businesses affected with a public inter-
est" and that governmental regulation of their fees violated the right
to substantive due process. In Ribnik, a landmark case discussed in
many Court histories, the Taft Court strangled the "businesses af-
fected with a public interest" doctrine. The decision excluded most
businesses from that category and therefore made them exempt from
price regulation.105 Another illustrative conservative victory was
Olmstead v. United States.'06 This case held that electronic intercep-
tion of oral communications is not a search or seizure and that wire-
tapping is therefore not subject to fourth amendment controls.107 The
102. Taft believed that the aged Holmes had by this time, become little more than a
proxy vote for Brandeis. "I am very fond of the old gentleman," Taft wrote in May, 1928,
"but he is so completely under the control of Brother Brandeis that it gives to Brandeis two
votes instead of one." Letter from William H. Taft to H. L. Stimson (May 18, 1928), quoted
in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 969.
103. In contrast, the four horsemen did not dissent as a bloc even once in the October
1927 Term.
104. 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (Holmes, J., Brandeis, J., and Stone, J., dissenting).
105. This stood on its head the seminal case in the "businesses affected with a public
interest" line, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), which had indicated that all businesses
which affect the public are subject to price regulation. Ribnik and other similar Taft Court
cases were rejected in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and its progeny, which
reactivated the broad Munn rule.
106. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Holmes, J., Brandeis, J., Stone, J., and Butler, J.
dissenting).
107. Olmstead was overruled forty years later by the Warren Court in Katz v. United
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other cases in which Brandeis, Holmes, and often Stone dissented
make up a laundry list of archaic law.1"8 However, the October 1927
Term case which perhaps best illustrates the prevailing conservatism
of the Taft Court was the unanimous Gong Lum v. Rice 09 decision,
in which the Court held the use of segregated public schools did not
violate the equal protection clause.10
To summarize, the October 1927 Term was a vintage year for
the conservative dominance characteristic of the Taft Court. Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone dissented openly and frequently for a change
and pushed dissent and disagreement rates to the highest levels of the
decade. This Term revealed the liberals' discontent with the prevail-
ing conservative constitutional activism of the era.
H. The October 1928 Term
When the October 1928 Term opened for business, the 1928
presidential election was only a month away. After Calvin Coolidge
withdrew, the Republicans nominated Herbert Hoover, a moderate
conservative. The Democrats nominated Alfred E. Smith, a liberal.
Taft maintained strong feelings about the importance of the election
for insuring the continued dominance of "sound" and "conservative"
views. To Taft's relief, Hoover won, assuring a dozen years of con-
tinuous Republican rule.
After the relatively vivid bloc alignments and interesting cases
of the prior two Terms, this last full Term of the Taft era is a lack-
luster disappointment to the Supreme Court historian. There were
no personnel changes for the fourth straight Term, and dissent and
disagreement rates on the Court dropped once again. The cases were
also lacking in interest and long-term importance. In short, the
Term may be considered a backwater of Supreme Court history.
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
108. See, e.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928) (tax law
violates equal protection) (Holmes, J., Brandeis, J., and Stone, J., dissenting); Panhandle Oil
Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (tax law violates intergovernmental im-
munity) (Holmes, J., Brandeis, J., Stone, J., and McReynolds, J., dissenting); King Mfg. Co.
v. City Council, 277 U.S. 100 (1928) (ordinance fixing rates for water and power violates
contract clause) (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J., dissenting); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cole-
man, 277 U.S. 32 (1928) (property tax violates substantive due process and equal protection)
(Holmes, J., Brandeis, J., Stone, J., and Sanford, J., dissenting); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276
U.S. 440 (1928) (tax law violates substantive due process) (Holmes, J., Brandeis, J., and
Stone, J., dissenting); Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 104 (1928)
(ICC rate order reversed) (Holmes, J., and Brandeis, J., dissenting).
109. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
110. Of course, Gong Lum was overuled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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The Justices lined up from the philosophical left to right as
expected during the October 1928 Term. On the left were Brandeis
and Holmes, who disagreed with each other in only three of 129
cases. Next came Stone, who had a surprisingly centrist voting rec-
ord, posting identical disagreement rates with Brandeis, Sanford,
Taft, and Sutherland. Sanford was next, leaning to the right, but
only slightly. Then came the closest voting bloc on the Court, Taft,
Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler. Once again, Taft and Van
Devanter were the closest pair, disagreeing only once in 128 cases."'
Finally, McReynolds had a voting record that is hard to classify. His
disagreement rates with Holmes (12.4 percent), and Brandeis (11.6
percent), were the highest of the Term, suggesting that he was lo-
cated at the Court's right extreme. However, he was not close to
anyone, and his dissents went both to the left and to the right. The
following table shows the polarized lineup of the Brandeis-Holmes
and Sutherland-Butler pairs.
TABLE 18
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1928 TERM
SUTHER-
BRANDEIS HOLMES LAND BUTLER
LIBERAL
Brandeis 2.3% 8.6% 10.2%
Holmes 
-- 7.8% 8.6%
CONSERVATIVE
Sutherland 1.6%
Butler
Voting data for the October 1928 Term suggest a minor shift to
the left after two Terms of increasing conservatism. McReynolds had
the highest dissent rate of the Term. Moreover, the three liberals,
Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone, cast almost the same total number of
dissents (nineteen) as the three most conservative Justices, McReyn-
olds, Butler, and Sutherland (seventeen). So, once again, although
the six-vote conservative wing may have had control of the Court on
paper, the "conservative dominance" is not manifested in the voting
111. Van Devanter was Taft's closest ally on the Court, both statistically and emotion-
ally. In 1923, Taft wrote, "My mainstay in the Court is Van Devanter." Letter from William
H. Taft to Helen Manning (June 11, 1923), quoted in 2 H1. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 971.
And a few years later he wrote, "Mr. Justice Van Devanter is far and away the most valuable
man in our court .... Van Devanter exercises more influence, a good deal, than any other
member of the court . . . ." Letter from William H. Taft to James R. Angell (Dec. 2, 1926),
quoted in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 971.
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statistics, except that the Term's moderate conservatives Sutherland,
Van Devanter, Taft, and Sanford, cast only twelve total dissents.
The following table illustrates both the shift to the left and the rela-
tively equal dissent rates at the Court's left and right extremes.
TABLE 19
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1927 &' 1928 TERMS
OCT. 1927 OCT. 1928
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Brandeis 9.7% 6.2% -3.5%
Holmes 9.7% 5.4% -4.3%
Stone 7.8% 3.2% -4.6%
CONSERVATIVE
Butler 2.3% 3.9% +1.6%
McReynolds 4.6% 7.0% +2.4%
The number of cases heard decreased dramatically from a peak
of 231 in the October 1924 Term, to 129 in the October 1928 Term.
Evidently, Taft's Judges Act of 1925 was taking effect. But the Jus-
tices' increased control over the Court's docket did not produce the
expected increase in the number of important cases. In fact, no
landmark cases were decided during the October 1928 Term. The
only noteworthy cases are those which illustrate the bloc alignments.
Brandeis and Holmes dissented together in only six cases, most of
which involved typical conservative constitutional activism."' The
four horsemen did not dissent even once as a bloc during the Term.
However, dissents were cast by two or more conservatives in several
cases involving the Court's refusal to take a more activist role in
defending the economic interests of business."1
112. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (6-3 decision) (citizenship); Ma-
callen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929) (6-3 decision) (intergovernmental tax immu-
nity); St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461 (1929) (5-3 decision)
(railroad rates; Butler's "reproduction cost" formula prevailed over Brandeis' "prudent invest-
ment" formula); Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (6-3 decision) (equal
protection); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929) (7-2 decision) (dormant com-
merce clause); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (7-2 decision) (substan-
tive due process).
113. White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U.S. 692 (1929) (equal protection)
(Butler, J., Van Devanter, J., and Taft, J., dissenting); Douglas v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) (privileges and immunities clause) (Butler, J., Van Devan-
ter, J., and Taft, J., dissenting); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transp. Co., 279 U.S. 159
(1929) (due process) (Butler, J., Sutherland, J., and Van Devanter, J., dissenting); Carson
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I. The October 1929 Term
Two personnel changes disrupted this ninth and last Term of
the Taft Court. In December, 1929, Chief Justice William Howard
Taft was disabled by illness. He ceased participating on December
9, 1929, resigned effective February 3, 1930, and died March 8,
1930. Coincidentally, Justice Edward Sanford also died on March 8,
1930. Charles Evans Hughes, President Hoover's nominee to suc-
ceed Taft as Chief Justice, was seated on February 24, 1930, and
participated in fifty-nine cases during the Term. Owen J. Roberts,
Sanford's successor, was seated on the last day of the Term, after the
Senate refused to confirm Hoover's first choice, John J. Parker. The
Taft era of Supreme Court history was over, and the Hughes Court
had begun.114
In October, 1929, the first month of the Taft Court's final
Term, the stock market crashed and the nation began its plunge into
the Great Depression. This economic turmoil exacerbated the split
between the court's liberals and conservatives. The former believed
that the state and federal governments should have wide latitude to
experiment with economic regulation, and the latter believed that the
due process clause was intended to enshrine liberty of contract and to
preserve a laissez faire economy free from government control.
Taft was alarmed in the last years of his life by the resurgence
of what he considered economic radicalism, and he shifted to the
right further and became increasingly strident in his attacks on the
liberals. As Taft's biographer put it, "Safety and the preservation of
a conservative majority in the court became an obsession with Taft
as the final days approached." 5 Just before the start of the October
1929 Term, for example, Taft wrote to Butler about his hope for
"continued life of enough of the present membership . . . to prevent
disastrous reversals of our present attitude. With Van and Mac and
Sutherland and you and Sanford, there will be five to steady the boat
• ..we must not give up at once."11 6 In letters to his brother, Hor-
Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929) (dormant commerce clause) (McReynolds, J., and
Sanford, J., dissenting); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929) (substantive
due process) (Butler, J., and Sutherland, J., dissenting).
114. For a description of voting patterns on the Hughes Court, see Galloway, The
Court That Challenged the New Deal (1930-1936), 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65 (1984)
(which also contains an analysis of the October 1929 Term) and Galloway, The Roosevelt
Court: The Liberals Conquer (1937-1941) and Divide (1941-1946), 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 491 (1983).
115. 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1044.
116. Letter from William H. Taft to Pierce Butler'(Sept. 14 1929), quoted in 2 H.
PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1044.
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ace, Taft wrote, "I must stay on the court in order to prevent the
Bolsheviki from getting control . . . .Brandeis is of course hopeless,
as Holmes is, and as Stone is." 117
The full Taft Court, including both Taft and Sanford, partici-
pated in only the first thirty-four cases of the October 1929 Term.
The conservatives were dominant during this stretch. Holmes and
Brandeis dissented together in five cases which all involved govern-
ment efforts to regulate the economy."' In contrast, neither Taft,
Sanford, nor McReynolds cast a single dissent in these thirty-four
cases. Moreover, the other three conservatives dissented only once, in
a case in which the majority held that a tax law did not violate due
process. 119
The following table shows the lineup on the Court during this
twilight period of the Taft Court.
TABLE 20
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES--START OF OCTOBER 1929 TERM
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Holmes Van Devanter
Brandeis Sutherland
Stone Butler
McReynolds
Taft
Sanford
Both Taft and Sanford were closely aligned with the conserva-
tive wing during their final months on the Court. They disagreed
with the liberals much more than with the four horsemen, as the
following table shows.
117. Letters from William H. Taft to Horace Taft (Nov. 14, 1929, Dec. 1, 1929),
quoted in 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 1044.
118. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930) (dormant
commerce clause); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) (antitrust); United
Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (1930) (substantive due process; rate regulation);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1929) (substantive due process;
taxes); Railroad Comm'n v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 280 U.S. 145 (1929) (substantive due
process; rate regulation). Stone joined Holmes and Brandeis in the International Shoe, United
Railways, and Los Angeles Railways cases. Holmes also dissented in Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929), another conservative-activist substantive due process case,
in which Brandeis and Stone concurred in the result only.
119. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
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TABLE 21
DISAGREEMENT RATES; TAFT AND
OCTOBER 1929 TERM
SANFORD--
TAFT SANFORD
LIBERAL
Holmes 17.6% 10.8%
Brandeis 14.7% 7.7%
Stone 9.1% 4.7%
CONSERVATIVE
McReynolds 0.0% 0.0%
Sutherland 2.9% 1.5%
Van Devanter 2.9% 3.1%
Butler 2.9% 3.1%
Taft's disagreement rates with Holmes and Brandeis were much
higher in 1929 than in prior Terms, confirming the sharp split be-
tween Taft and the liberals at the end of Taft's tenure.
The loss of Taft and Sanford in early 1930 reduced the previ-
ously dominant conservative wing from six to four members, leaving
the increasingly reactionary four horsemen-McReynolds, Butler,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter-to confront the liberal trio of Bran-
deis, Holmes, and Stone. The following table shows the lineup of
Justices at the Court's right and left extremes during the entire Oc-
tober 1929 Term.
TABLE 22
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1929 TERM
Me- SUTHER- VAN
BRANDEIS STONE REYNOLDS LAND DEVANTER BUTLER
LIBERAL
Holmes 0.8% 1.5% 7.6% 8.3% 9.0% 9.0%
Brandeis -- 0.8% 6.9% 7.5% 8.3% 8.3%
Stone -- 5.4% 6.1% 6.9% 6.9%
CONSERVATIVE
McReynolds 0.8% 1.5% 1.5%
Sutherland -- 0.8% 0.8%
Van Devanter -- 0.0%
Butler L
Although the disagreement rates between the two blocs were not es-
pecially high, Table 22 clearly shows the existence of cohesive voting
blocs on the right and on the left. Obviously, in such a situation,
control of the Court would depend on the behavior of the Justices
who were selected to replace Taft and Sanford, namely Charles Ev-
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ans Hughes and Owen J. Roberts. During the October 1929 Term,
Hughes leaned to the right, Roberts did not participate, and the con-
servatives dominated. In fact, the three liberals cast 83.9 percent of
the dissents during the Term, and the entire conservative wing cast a
total of only five dissenting votes.
TABLE 23
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1929 TERM
DISSENT
JUSTICE DISSENTS RATE
LIBERAL
Holmes 10 7.5%
Brandeis 9 6.7%
Stone 7 5.4%
CONSERVATIVE
McReynolds 0 0.0%
Sutherland 1 0.7%
Van Devanter 2 1.5%
Butler 2 1.5%
Thus, the Taft Court closed with a period of the conservative domi-
nance which characterized the Taft era of Supreme Court history.
III. TRENDS DURING THE TAFT ERA
A. Voting Patterns
Taft served as Chief Justice during the October 1921 through
1929 Terms of Supreme Court history. Although, in general, the
Court's moderate conservatives such as Taft, Sanford, and Van De-
vanter dominated throughout this period, the nine Taft Court Terms
can be best understood if they are divided into two subperiods which
were marked by somewhat different voting patterns. The October
1921 through 1924 Terms comprised the first subperiod, when the
Court underwent a series of personnel changes and had very nebu-
lous bloc alignments. The October 1925 through 1929 Terms com-
prised the second subperiod, when the Court's lineup was stable and
the voting patterns were more vivid.
The first four Terms of the Taft Court were disrupted by five
personnel changes: Taft replaced White in 1921; Sutherland re-
placed Clarke in 1922; Butler replaced Day in 1922-23; Sanford re-
placed Pitney in 1922-23; and Stone replaced McKenna in 1924-25.
During this period, voting patterns were very flat. This was perhaps
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due in part to the so-called "freshman effect," or the tendency of
new Justices to go along with the majority. On the Taft Court, how-
ever, this tendency was also due to Chief Justice Taft's policy to
suppress dissent and to emphasize the importance of harmonious re-
lations on the Court.
Detailed examination of the voting data for the early years of
the Taft era uncovers a number of surprises. First, the dissent and
disagreement rates for the October 1922 through 1924 Terms were
amazingly low. The highest disagreement rate, for example, was a
mere 7.9 percent between Brandeis on the far left and McReynolds
on the far right. Second, the expected polarization between the con-
servative group led by Taft and the four horsemen, and the liberals,
Brandeis and Holmes, is not really manifested in the voting data.
Instead, the voting statistics suggest the following 2-6-1 lineup.
TABLE 24
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES--
OCTOBER 1921-1924 TERMS
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Brandeis Taft McReynolds
Holmes Butler
Sanford
McKenna
Van Devanter
Sutherland
Taft and Butler, two Justices normally labelled "conservatives"
in the history books, were actually to the left of the Court's statistical
center during this period, although by a very narrow margin. Taft,
for example, had a higher disagreement rate with McReynolds (5.3
percent), than with Brandeis (4.6 percent), and with Holmes (3.5
percent). And Butler, often considered the second most reactionary of
the four horsemen, also disagreed more with McReynolds (4.9 per-
cent), than with Brandeis (3.9 percent) and with Holmes (3.2 per-
cent). In contrast, McKenna, who is frequently depicted as a moder-
ate liberal, was slightly to the right of the Court's statistical center,
disagreeing with Brandeis (6.1 percent) more than with McReynolds
(5.8 percent). Another surprise is that despite all the conservatives on
the Court, McReynolds had a dissent rate (4.8 percent) which was
higher than Brandeis (4.1 percent), Holmes (2.7 percent), and all
the other Justices. However, the lowest dissent rates were posted by
the more moderate conservatives: Butler (1.0 percent), Sanford (1.1
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percent), Van Devanter (1.5 percent), and Taft (1.7 percent).
During the second half of the Taft era, namely the October
1925 through 1929 Terms, the Justices' voting patterns reveal fewer
surprises. As expected, the four horsemen, McReynolds, Sutherland,
Butler, and Van Devanter, had the most conservative voting records.
The most liberal records were posted by Brandeis, Holmes, and
Stone respectively. The following table shows the lineup at the
Court's extremes.
TABLE 25
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1925 THROUGH 1929
TERMS
VAN SUTHER- Mc-
HOLMES STONE DEVANTER BUTLER LAND REYNOLDS
LIBERAL
Brandeis 2.0% 4.3% 7.6% 8.8% 11.4% 9.5%
Holmes -- 3.2% 6.5% 7.8% 8.5% 9.3%
Stone 
-- 5.5% 6.5% 6.3% 8.1%
CONSERVATIVE
Van Devanter 1.5% 3.0% 4.9%
Butler 
-- 2.1% 4.5%
Sutherland 
-- 6.1%
McReynolds ..
Given the 4-3 split between the four horsemen and three liber-
als, Taft and Sanford had the controlling votes. Taft and Sanford
leaned to the right, living up to the conservative reputations that led
President Harding to appoint them. These two Justices aligned most
closely with Van Devanter and disagreed most frequently with
Brandeis and Holmes. The following table shows the right-of-center
alignment of the two swing Justices.
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TABLE 26
TAFT & SANFORD'S DISAGREEMENT RATES--
OCTOBER 1925-1929 TERMS
DISAGREEMENT DISAGREEMENT
JUSTICE RATE WITH TAFT RATE WITH SANFORD
LEFT
Brandeis 7.4% 7.2%
Holmes 5.8% 7.0%
RIGHT
Sutherland 4.3% 3.8%
McReynolds 5.2% 5.3%
CENTER
Van Devanter 0.9% 3.2%
Taft -- 2.8%
Sanford --
In short, the lineup of Justices in the second half of the Taft era
was as follows:
TABLE 27
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES--1925 THROUGH 1930
LEFT CENTER RIGHT
Brandeis Sanford- McReynolds
Holmes Taft --- Sutherland
Stone Butler
Van Devanter
Naturally, the conservatives dominated. The highest dissent
rates during the period were posted by Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone
respectively. Out of 250 dissents cast during the five Terms, the
three liberals accounted for 141 or 56.4 percent. The lowest dissent
rates were posted by the moderate conservatives, Taft (0.5 percent)
and Van Devanter (0.9 percent). In fact, Brandeis cast more than
twice as many dissents (fifty-seven) as Taft, Van Devanter, and San-
ford combined (twenty-eight). The following table shows the distri-
bution of dissents during the five Terms.
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TABLE 28
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 925 THROUGH 1929 TERMS
DISSENT
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE
LEFT
Brandeis 842 57 6.8%
Holmes 842 46 5.5%
Stone 817 38 4.7%
CENTER
Sanford 776 16 2.1%
Taft 744 4 0.5%
RIGHT
Van Devanter 845 8 0.9%
Butler 842 21 2.5%
Sutherland 778 23 3.0%
McReynolds 843 37 4.4%
Based on the composite voting data for the entire 1921-1930
period, the conservative wing fared better in general than the liberal
wing. The conservative four horsemen were able to get enough extra
votes from Taft and Sanford to win most of the bloc-voting cases. As
Table 29 shows, the moderate conservatives, Taft, Van Devanter,
and Sanford had the lowest dissent rates; the liberals had the highest;
and the Justices of the far right were in between.
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TABLE 29
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1921 THROUGH 1929 TERMS
DISSENT
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE
LEFT
Clarke 163 16 9.8%
Brandeis 1675 91 5.4%
Holmes 1682 69 4.1%
Stone 902 38 4.2%
CENTER
Pitney 219 4 1.8%
McKenna 692 19 2.7%
Day 202 4 2.0%
Sanford 1324 22 1.7%
Taft 1580 18 1.1%
RIGHT
Van Devanter 1686 21 1.2%
Butler 1432 27 1.9%
Sutherland 1435 41 2.9%
McReynolds 1681 77 4.6%
The conservative bloc maintained its power by voting very cohe-
sively, With Taft, Van Devanter, and Butler aligned especially
closely. Van Devanter and Butler, for example, disagreed only sev-
enteen times in the 1430 cases in which both participated, achieving
an agreement rate of nearly 99 percent. McReynolds had the most
disagreements with the other conservatives, but even he had agree-
ment rates of roughly 95 percent with all of the other five conserva-
tives. Table 30 shows the low disagreement rates within the con-
servative bloc during the Taft era.
TABLE 30
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1921 THROUGH 1929
TERMS
VAN SUTHER-
TAFT SANFORD DEVANTER BUTLER LAND
TAFT -- 2.2% 1.5% 2.5% 4.0%
SANFORD -- 2.7% 3.1% 3.4%
VAN DEVANTER -- 1.2% 2.6%
BUTLER 
-- 2.5%
SUTHERLAND
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Cohesion among the conservatives peaked during the October 1925
Term, when Taft disagreed with Van Devanter and Butler only
once in 209 cases, and Van Devanter and Butler agreed in all 209
cases.
Disagreement rates within the liberal bloc were also very low.
Brandeis and Holmes were the closest, disagreeing in only thirty-five
of 1670 cases (2.1 percent). Stone had low disagreement rates with
both Holmes (3.0 percent) and Brandeis (4.3 percent). Naturally,
the disagreement rates between the Justices at the Court's right and
left extremes were higher, but, as Table 31 shows, they were much
lower than in the 1950's and 1970's, when disagreement rates above
fifty percent became common and occasional disagreement rates
above sixty-five percent appeared.
TABLE 31
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1921 THROUGH 1929
TERMS
SUTHER- Mc-
HOLMES STONE BUTLER LAND REYNOLDS
LIBERAL
Brandeis 2.1% 4.3% 6.8% 8.6% 8.7%
Holmes -- 3.0% 5.9% 6.4% 7.8%
Stone -- 6.1% 6.3% 7.9%
CONSERVATIVE
Butler -- 2.5% 4.7%
Sutherland 
-- 4.7%
Van Devanter
The conservative edge in the won-lost column was gained pri-
marily through the support of Sanford and Taft. Sanford was to the
right of center in six of his nine Terms, and especially so in the
October 1927 and 1929 Terms. The following table shows that San-
ford was closest to Taft, and that Van Devanter was furthest from
the liberals.
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TABLE 32
SANFORD'S DISAGREEMENT RATES--
OCTOBER 1922 THROUGH 1929 TERMS
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH SANFORD
LIBERAL
B randeis ...................................... 5.9%
H olm es ...................................... 5.4%
S ton e ......... .................. .. ........... 5.0 %
A verage .................................... 5.4%
MODERATE-
CONSERVATIVE
T aft .................... ......... 2.2%
V an D evanter ................................. 2.7%
A verage .................................... 2.5%
CONSERVATIVE
B u tler ...... .............. ............ ........ 3.1%
Sutherland .................................... 3.4%
M cR eynolds ................................... 4.6%
A verage .................................... 3.7%
Taft, in contrast, was quite close to the Court's statistical center dur-
ing the decade. He disagreed with Brandeis (5.9 percent), and
Holmes (4.6 percent), only slightly more than with McReynolds (5.3
percent) and Sutherland (4.0 percent).
As previously stated, one of the most striking features of the
voting data for the 1920's was the exceptionally low dissent and dis-
agreement rates. Table 33 shows that these rates were highest dur-
ing the October 1921 Term, the first of the decade; that they
dropped dramatically during Taft's honeymoon period in the Octo-
ber 1922 through 1924 Terms, and that they increased in the late
1920's and, peaked in the October 1927 Term.
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TABLE 33
MISCELLANEOUS VOTING DATA--
OCTOBER 1921 THROUGH 1929 TERMS
UNANIMOUS AVERAGE DISSENTS HIGHEST DIS-
TERM DECISIONS PER CASE AGREEMENT RATE
OCT. 1921 78.6% 0.50 17.4%
OCT. 1922 92.9% 0.15 5.8%
OCT. 1923 90.1% 0.18 7.1%
OCT. 1924 89.6% 0.19 8.3%
OCT. 1925 91.9% 0.16 5.9%
OCT. 1926 84.9% 0.35 11.9%
OCT. 1927 84.6% 0.43 19.1%
OCT. 1928 83.7% 0.35 12.4%
OCT. 1929 90.0% 0.26 9.0%
Average 87.8% 0.27 10.8%
B. Substantive Legal Trends
The overwhelming majority of the Taft Court's decisions were
concerned with issues involving regulation of the economy. Cases in-
volving civil liberties, which comprise such a large part of the Su-
preme Court's post-1937 docket, were relatively infrequent. There-
fore, any effort to understand the work product of the Taft Court
must begin with analysis of decisions in the economic cases. The
Taft Court is most famous for economic cases in which it sat as con-
stitutional censor over governmental efforts to regulate the economy.
The Court struck down state and federal attempts to ameliorate the
harshness of the free enterprise system.
The most well known cases manifesting the Taft Court's con-
servative constitutional activism were the substantive due process
cases. Most notorious of all was Adkins v. Children's Hospital,"'0
which struck down the Washington, D.C. minimum wage law for
women and children. The Court asserted in Adkins that in the area
of wages and hours, liberty of contract was the general rule and reg-
ulation the exception. In a second famous line of cases, which in-
cluded Tyson v. Banton,"" and Ribnik v. McBride, 2' the Taft
Court constricted the "business affected with a public interest" doc-
trine and held that substantive due process bans price regulation in
all but a few industries, such as public utilities and rail transporta-
120. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
121. 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
122. 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
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tion."'2 Another notable line of substantive due process cases policed
government rate-setting programs, and struck down rates which the
Court considered unreasonably low.'24 The Taft Court used sub-
stantive due process to strike down many regulatory efforts,' 25 but it
upheld a good many as well. 2
The Taft Court's conservative constitutional activists made use
of a variety of constitutional weapons in addition to substantive due
process. The dormant commerce clause was used in a long line of
cases to strike down state efforts to regulate industry." 7 The equal
protection clause was used to censor efforts to regulate the econ-
omy.' 28 At the same time, the equal protection clause was virtually
emptied of all significance as a defender of minority groups such as
nonwhite persons'29 and aliens. 80 The contract clause, that old fa-
vorite of the nineteenth century Supreme Court, was also pressed
into service.' 8 ' To keep the federal government off the back of busi-
ness, the Court also adopted a restrictive interpretation of federal
power based on the later-discarded tenth amendment concept of dual
federalism.'
Again, the decisions in these areas are diverse. Many regulatory
activities were upheld against dormant commerce clause, equal pro-
123. Cf Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
124. E.g., St Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461 (1929); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403 (1924); Missouri v. Public Serv.,
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923); Railroad Comm. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563
(1922).
125. E.g., Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927); Weaver v. Palmer
Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
126. E.g., Dayton, Goose-Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
127. E.g., Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S.
307 (1925); Texas Trans. & Terminal Co. v. City of New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150 (1924);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Lemke v. Homer Farmers Elevator Co.,
258 U.S. 65 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
128. E.g., Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32
(1928); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S.
230 (1926); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923);
Thomas v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 261 U.S. 481 (1923); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
129. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
131. E.g., King Mfg. Co. v. City Council, 277 U.S. 100 (1928); Ohio Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Ohio ex rel Fritz, 274 U.S. 12 (1927); Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. City of Supe-
rior, 263 U.S. 125 (1923); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Mayor and Council, 262 U.S. 441
(1923); Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923).
132. E.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922).
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tection, contract clause, and tenth amendment attacks.133 However,
the dominant pattern which typifies the Taft era is the exceptionally
high number of cases in which the Court held economic regulations
unconstitutional, and substituted its views for those of federal and
state legislatures. As one commentator has pointed out, the Taft
Court declared twice as many laws unconstitutional in the 1920's as
the White Court had in the prior decade."3
The Taft Court's economic conservatism was also very strong in
the field of labor law. The Court gave its continued blessing to the
use of the labor injunction by largely nullifying federal and state
efforts to prevent courts from interfering with collective action by
union members.' 35 The Court applied the antitrust laws more ag-
gressively to labor unions' than to the corporations which were the
primary intended targets of the laws.'3 7 The Court held, for the first
time, that unions are subject to suit and that their funds are subject
to attachment.' In general, the Court had an anti-labor bias as re-
vealed in the following statement by Taft:
The only class which is distinctly arrayed against the court is a
class that does not like the courts at any rate, and that is organ-
ized labor. That faction we have to hit every little while, be-
cause they are continually violating the law and depending on
threats and violence to accomplish their purpose. " 9
In striking contrast to the prevailing activism in economic cases,
the Taft Court showed remarkable restraint in enforcing constitu-
tional prohibitions designed to protect civil liberties outside the eco-
nomic arena. In fact, the Court was almost completely passive in the
main civil liberties fields such as freedom of expression, race rela-
tions, and criminal procedure, which have occupied the attention of
the post-1937 Supreme Court.
133. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (substantive due process); see
also cases cited supra note 24.
134. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 158 (1960).
135. E.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926); Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
(1921); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
136. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
137. The Court's enforcement of antitrust laws against corporations was relatively
weak. The conservatives were especially successful in gutting Brandeis' brainchild, the Federal
Trade Commission. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); FTC v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927); FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926);
FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924).
138. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
139. Letter from William H. Taft to Horace Taft (May 7, 1927), quoted in 2 H.
PRINGLE, supra note 1, at 967.
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During the entire decade of the 1920's, there was only one sig-
nificant development in first amendment law. This was the ruling in
Gitlow v. New York,' 40 which held that the fourteenth amendment
due process clause incorporates the free speech clause and makes it
applicable to the States. While this holding had immense long-term
importance, it made almost no difference in the 1920's, because the
Court refused to adopt an aggressive, speech-protective approach to
the enforcement of freedom of expression. Instead, in Gitlow and in
Whitney v. California,"" which was the second most famous free
speech case of the decade, the majority applied the weak "remote bad
tendency test."" 2 These decisions nullified the free speech clause by
allowing the government to punish that speech which is intended and
has a tendency to produce results that the government may prohibit.
As a result, Fiske v. Kansas"13 was the only case of the decade in
which the Court held government action unconstitutional on first
amendment-free speech grounds. Gitlow, Whitney, and Fiske were
the only significant free speech cases decided by the Taft Court.
The Taft Court's record was almost as passive in the race rela-
tions field, which has become such an important element of modern
Supreme Court law. Racial minorities won only two landmark cases
in the entire decade: Moore v. Dempsey,'" which reversed the mob-
dominated convictions and death sentences of black participants in
the 1919 shootout in Phillips County, Arkansas; and Nixon v.
Herndon," which held Texas's whites-only primary unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause. Otherwise, the Taft Court
went along with the prevailing racism of the 1920's and did nothing
to enforce the civil rights of racial minorities. Thus, although it made
effective use of the equal protection clause to prevent government
regulation of business," the Taft Court refused to use the clause for
its intended purpose of protecting minority groups from governmen-
tal discrimination. The cases which best illustrate the Court's passiv-
ity on race issues are Gong Lum v. Rice,"7 which held that the gov-
ernment may require children to attend racially segregated schools,
and Corrigan v. Buckley,' 8 which held that courts may enforce re-
140. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
141. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
142. See supra note 64.
143. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
144. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
145. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
146. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
147. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
148. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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strictive covenants banning the sale of real property to racial minori-
ties. The Court also held that the equal protection clause allows
States to ban aliens from owning real property. 49 The decisions in
Gong Lum, Corrigan, Dempsey, and Nixon were the only major race
cases the Court chose to hear in the decade. This indicates the
Court's indifference to the plight of minorities in a racist society.
The Taft Court was similarly passive in the criminal procedure
field. This field would later become a third major area of constitu-
tional activism in the post-1937 era. Although the Court did decide
numerous criminal procedure cases during the decade, not a single
liberal-activist landmark decision was issued. All of the famous cases
went against the defendants. Olmstead v. United States,50 for exam-
ple, held that wiretaps were not subject to the fourth amendment.
Carroll v. United States'5' spawned the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement. Hester v. United States"5 2 held that the fourth
amendment protects only the curtilage (i.e., house and attached
structures) and does not protect against intrusions into open fields.
United States v. Lanza 5 ' held squarely, for the first time, that the
double jeopardy clause does not prohibit consecutive trials for the
same offense in state and federal courts. In contrast to its constitu-
tional activism in the economic arena, the Taft Court showed no
inclination to engage in constitutional censorship of criminal prose-
cutions. This is especially striking because the Constitution contains
numerous explicit rules regulating criminal prosecutions. Notably,
the Taft Court refused to hold that any of the criminal procedure
rules of the Bill of Rights were applicable to the States and further,
the Court made almost no use of the due process-fundamental fair-
ness rule.'"
IV. CONCLUSION
The Taft era of Supreme Court history was mostly dominated
by the Court's conservative wing. After several years of rapid per-
sonnel turnover and nebulous voting patterns, the Court came under
the control of a six-vote conservative bloc which included the four
149. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225
(1923).
150. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
151. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
152. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
153. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
154. The Court did strike down one conviction on the ground that due process bans
prosecution by a biased judge. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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horsemen, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, and Van Devanter, as
well as, Chief Justice Taft, and Edward Sanford. The liberals,
Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone, initially yielded quietly to Taft's pres-
sure for unanimity, and then dissented more often during the second
half of the decade.
The Taft Court's conservative dominance was manifested by
both the decisions in a long line of activist cases in which the Court
protected the laissez faire, free enterprise system against federal and
state regulations, and by the Court's deferential, passive approach to
civil liberties. Like the 1930-36 Hughes Court years, the 1920's
were "a backwater of Supreme Court history," 15 5 and the Taft
Court's most famous landmarks were superseded in the constitu-
tional revolution of 1937 and the subsequent era of economic re-
straint and civil liberties activism.
155. Galloway, The Court That Challenged the New Deal (1930-1936), 24 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 65, 98 (1984).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1921 TERM
C-larke # 82 t10 8.3 1.0 8.6 9 13.5 174
% 13/158 18/163 13/156 18/163 14/162 15/162 22/163 28/161
Brandeis # 4.2 6.2 11.9 10.8 10.2 13.1 13.8
% 7/168 10/161 20/168 18/167 17/167 22/168 23/167
Holmes # 6.6 9.2 7.6 7.6 8.7 9.4
% 11/166 16/173 13/172 13/172 15/173 16/171
Pitney # 8.4 4.8 4.8 7.2 10.0
% 14 166 8/165 8/165 12/166 117/170
McKenna # 6.4 8.7 9.8 9.4
% _ 11/172 15/172 17/173 16/171
Day # 4.7 7.0 7.6
% 8/171 12/172 13/170
Taft # 4.1 8.8
% 7/172 15/170
Van Devanter # 3.5
% 6/171
McReynolds #
%.
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TABLE 2
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1922 TERM
A
Brandei, # 1.8 1.4 1.9 3.1 0.0 5.7 1.4 2.7 4.0 5.0
% 4/223 3/222 2/104 7/223 0/30 3/53 2/148 6/223 9/223 11/221
l1hImes $ 2.2 3.8 3.6 0.0 1.9 3.4 3.1 4.5 4.5
% 5/223 4/105 8/224 0/30 1/53 5/149 7/224 10/224 10/221
Taft # 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.9 0.7 1.3 3.1 4.5
% 0/104 4/223 0/30 1/53 1/148 3/223 7/223 10/222
Sanford A 2.0 . 1.0 1.9 3.8 5.8
% 3/105 1/104 2/105 4/105 6/104
McKenna A 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 3.6 3.6
% 0/30 0/30 2/149 3/224 8/224 8/222
Day # 0.0 -- 0.0 3.3 0.0
% 0/30 0/30 1/30 0/30
Pitney # 0.0 1.9 1.9
% 0/53 1/53 1/53
Butler # 0.7 2.7 4.1
% 1 1/149 4/149 6/148
Van Devanter # 3.1 3.2
% 7/224 7/222
McReynolds # 3.6
i% 8/222
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TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1923 TERM
C5 ---_, -- = , ., -, , --- ,
Brandeis # 1.4 6.6 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.2 5.7 7.1
% 1_3/212 14/212 1_9/209 10/206 11/212 11/211 12/210 15/211
Holmes # 5.2 2.9 3.4 3.8 3.8 4.3 5.2
% 11/212 6/209 7/206 8/212 8/211 9/210 11/211
McKenna # 2.9 3.4 2.3 3.3 1.9 5.2
% 6/210 7/207 5/213 7/212 4/211 11/212
Tart # 1.5 0.5 1.4 1.0 3.8
% 3/204 1/210 3/209 2/208 8/209
Sutherland # 1.9 1.0 2.4 2.4
% 4/207 2/206 5/205 15/206
Van Devanter A 1.9 0.5 4.7
% 4/212 1/211 10/212
Sanford A 2.4 2.8
% 5/210 6/211
Butter # 4.3
% 9/210
McReynolds #
V% ___
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TABLE 4
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1924 TERM
Et
Brandeis # 1.7 4.7 1.2 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.9 6.2 8.3
% 4/230 4/85 1/81 9/230 9/230 8/230 9/229 14/227 19/230
Holmes 1.2 0.0 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.2 3.9 6.5
S1/85 0/82 5/231 5/231 4/231 5/230 9/228 15/231
Stone -- 3.5 2.4 1.2 2.4 6.0 5.9
% 3/85 2/85 1/85 2/85 5/83 5/85
McKenna # 0.0 2.4 1.2 1.2 3.7 6.1
% 0/82 2/82 1/82 1/82 3/82 5/82
Taft 1.7 2.2 3.5 4.8 6.1
% 4/231 5/231 8/230 11/228 14/231
Sanford # 2.2 2.6 3.5 4.3
% 5/231 6/230 8/228 10/231
Van Devanter # 0.9 1.3 4.8
% 2/230 3/228 11/231
Butler 3.1 6.1
% 7/227 14/230
Sutherland A 4.8
11/228
McReynolds #
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TABLE 5
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1925 TERM
*0
Brandeis # 3.5 2.5 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.3 5.9 5.3
% 7/200 4/204 7/207 8/207 9/207 9/207 12/203 11/207
Stone # 1.5 3.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 4.0 5.9
% 3/203 7/202 4/202 5/202 5/202 8/198 12/202
Holmes # 2.9 1.5 1.9 1.9 3.5 4.9
% 6 206 3/206 4 206 4/206 7/202 10/206
Sanford # 1.4 .9 1.9 2.4 4.8
% 3/209 4/209 4/209 5/205 10/209
Taft # 0.5 0.5 2.0 4.3
% 1/209 1/209 4/205 9/209
Van Deva15er # 0.0 1.5 3.8
% 0/209 3/205 8/209
Butler # 1.5 3.8
% 3/205 8/209
Sutherland # 4.4
% 9/205
McReynolds #
%
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TABLE 6
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1926 TERM
Vol. 25
r 0
C C~
0t. eq .0 0' C' C, 0 '
Brandeis # 3.1 5.2 7.1 7.6 7.6 11.3 11.9 11.7
% 6/196 10/191 14/196 15/197 15/197 22/194 23/194 23/197
Holmes A 4.2 4.1 5.6 6.1 9.2 9.7 9.6
% 8/191 8/197 11/198 12/198 18/195 19/195 19/197
Stone # 4.2 4.7 5.7 7.2 8.9 9.9
% 8/191 9/192 11/192 14/194 17/190 19/192
Taft # 3.0 2.0 6.2 6.7 6.6
% 6/198 4/198 12/195 13/195 13/197
Sanford # 3.0 3.6 5.1 6.1
% 6/199 7/196 10/196 12/198
Van Devanter # 4.1 3.6 5.6
% 8/196 7/196 11/198
Sutherland # 1.5 5.6
% 3/194 11/195
Butler A 5.1
% 10/195
McReynolds #
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TABLE 7
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1927 TERM
Holmes # 1.1 4.8 9.7 9.8 10.9 12.0 13.1 17.4
% 2/175 8/167 17/175 17/174 19/175 21/175 23/175 20/115
Brandeis # 6.0 9.7 9.8 9.7 10.9 12.0 19.1
% 10/167 17/175 17/174 17/175 19/175 21/175 22/115
Stone # 7.8 7.8 9.0 9.0 9.0 11.0
% 13/167 13/167 15/167 15/167 15/167 12/109
Taft # 0.0 2.3 3.4 4.6 6.1
% 0/174 4/175 6/175 8/175 7/115
Van Devanter # 2.3 3.4 4.6 6.1
% 4/174 6/174 8/174 7/114
Butler # 3.4 4.6 6.1
% 6/175 8/175 7/115
Sanford # 5.7 4.3
% 10/175 5/115
McReynolds # 8.7
Suthe d # 1 10/11
Sutherland #
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TABLE 8
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1928 TERM
Brandeis # 2.3 4.8 6.2 7.8 8.5 8.6 10.2 11.6
% 3/129 6/126 8/129 110/128 11/129 111/128 13/128 115/129
Holmes # 4.0 7.0 7.0 7.8 7.8 8.6 12.4
% 5/126 9/129 9/128 10/129 10/128 11/128 16/129
Stone # 4.8 4.8 5.6 4.8 5.6 10.3
% 6/126 6/125 7/126 6/126 7/125 13/126
Sanford # 2.4 5.4 3.9 5.5 7.0
% 6/128 7/129 5/128 7/128 19/129
Taft # 0.8 3.9 2.4 7.0
% 1/128 5/127 3/127 9/128
Van Devanter # 3.1 1.6 9.3
% 4/128 2/128 12/129
Sutherland # 1.6 9.4
% 2/127 12/128
Butler # 9.4
%_______ 
__ /2 /2 12/128
McReynolds #
%
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TABLE 9
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1929 TERM
15 c#c>
Holmes # 0.8 1.5 3.8 17.6 10.8 7.6 8.3 9.0 9.0
% 1/133 2/131 2/53 6/34 7/65 10/131 11/133 12/133 12/133
Brandeis # 0.8 3.8 14.7 7.7 6.9 7.5 8.3 8.3
% 1/131 2/53 5/34 5/65 9/131 10/133 11/133 11/133
Stone # 3.8 9.1 4.7 5.4 6.1 6.9 6.9
% 2/52 3/33 3/64 7/129 8/131 9/131 9/131
Hughes # 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
%o 0/51 0/53 0/53 0/53
Taft # 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.9 2.9
% 0/34 0/34 1/34 1/34 1/34
Sanford A 0.0 1.5 3.1 3.1
% 0/65 1/65 2/65 2/65
McReynolds # 0.8 1.5 1.5
% 1/133 2/133 2/133
Sutherland # 0.8 0.8
% 1/133 1/133
Van Devanter # 0.0
% 0/133
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1921 TERM
.JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Clarke 163 16 9.8%
Brandeis 168 14 8.3%
Holmes 173 9 5.2%
Pitney 166 4 2.4%
McKenna 173 11 6.4%
Day 172 4 2.3%
Taft 172 6 3.5%
Van Devanter 173 8 4.6%
McReynolds 171 13 7.6%
TABLE 2
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1922 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Brandeis 223 5 2.2% -6.1%
Holmes 224 6 2.7% -2.5%
Taft 223 2 0.9% -2.6%
Sanford 105 1 1.0% --
McKenna 224 2 0.9% -5.5%
Day 30 0 0.0% -2.3%
Pitney 53 0 0.0% -2.4%
Butler 149 0 0.0% --
Van Devanter 224 1 0.4% -4.2%
McReynolds 224 6 2.7% -4.9%
Sutherland 222 8 3.6%
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TABLE 3
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1923 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE'
Brandeis 212 9 4.2% +2.0%
Holmes 212 6 2.8% +0.1%
McKenna 213 5 2.3% +1.4%
Taft 210 1 0.5% -0.4%
Sutherland 207 2 1.0% -2.6%
Van Devanter 213 2 0.9% +0.5%
Sanford 212 2 0.9% -0.1%
Butler 211 3 1.4% +1.4%
McReynolds 212 8 3.8% +1.1%
TABLE 4
DISSENT RATES--OCTOBER 1924 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Brandeis 230 6 2.6% -1.6%
Holmes 231 2 0.9% -1.9%
Stone 85 0 0.0% --
McKenna 82 1 1.2% -1.1%
Taft 231 5 2.2% +1.7%
Sanford 231 3 1.3% +0.4%
Van Devanter 231 2 0.9% 0.0%
Butler 230 3 1.3% -0.1%
Sutherland 228 8 3.5% + 2.5%
McReynolds 231 13 5.6% +1.8%
19851
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TABLE 5
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1925 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Brandeis 207 8 3.9% + 1.3%
Stones 202 4 2.0% + 2.0%
Holmes 206 3 1.5% +0.6%
Sanford 209 3 1.4% +0.1%
Taft 209 0 0.0% -2.2%
Van Devanter 209 1 0.5% -0.4%
Butler 209 1 0.5% -0.8%
Sutherland 205 4 2.0% -1.5%
McReynolds 209 9 4.3% -1.3%
TABLE 6
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1926 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Brandeis 197 14 7.1% +3.2%
Holmes 198 10 5.1% +3.6%
Stone 192 10 5.2% +3.2%
Taft 198 2 1.0% +1.0%
Sanford 199 3 1.5% +0.1%
Van Devanter 199 2 1.0% +0.5%
Sutherland 196 8 4.1% +2.1%
Butler 196 9 4.6% +4.1%
McReynolds 198 11 5.6% +1.3%
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TABLE 7
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1927 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Holmes 175 17 9.7% +4.6%
Brandeis 175 17 9.7% +2.6%
Stone 167 13 7.8% +2.6%
Taft 175 0 0.0% -1.0%
Van Devanter 174 0 0.0% -1.0%
Butler 175 4 2.3% -2.3%
Sanford 175 6 3.4% +1.9%
McReynolds 175 8 4.6% -1.0%
Sutherland 115 7 6.1% +2.0%
TABLE 8
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1928 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Brandeis 129 8 6.2% -3.5%
Holmes 129 7 5.4% -4.3%
Stone 126 4 3.2% -4.6%
Sanford 129 4 3.1% -0.3%
Taft 128 2 1.6% +1.6%
Van Devanter 129 3 2.3% +2.3%
Sutherland 128 3 2.3% -3.8%
Butler 128 5 3.9% + 1.6%
McReynolds 129 9 7.0% +2.4%
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TABLE 9
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1929 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Holmes 134 10 7.5% +2.1%
Brandeis 134 9 6.7% +0.5%
Stone 130 7 5.4% +2.2%
Hughes 53 0 0.0% --
Taft 34 0 0.0% -1.6%
Sanford 64 0 0.0% -3.1%
McReynolds 132 0 0.0% -7.0%
Sutherland 134 1 0.7% -1.6%
Van Devanter 134 2 1.5% -0.8%
Butler 134 2 1.5% -2.4%
